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St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province Index Generalis � PROLOGUE � QUESTION 1. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE � QUESTION 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD � QUESTION 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD � QUESTION 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD � QUESTION 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL � QUESTION 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD � QUESTION 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD � QUESTION 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS � QUESTION 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD � QUESTION 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD � QUESTION 11. THE UNITY OF GOD � QUESTION 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (1 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. � QUESTION 13. THE NAMES OF GOD � QUESTION 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE � QUESTION 15. OF IDEAS � QUESTION 16. OF TRUTH � QUESTION 17. CONCERNING FALSITY � QUESTION 18. THE LIFE OF GOD � QUESTION 19. THE WILL OF GOD � QUESTION 20. GOD'S LOVE � QUESTION 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD � QUESTION 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD � QUESTION 23. OF PREDESTINATION � QUESTION 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE � QUESTION 25. THE POWER OF GOD � QUESTION 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE � QUESTION 27. THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS � QUESTION 28. THE DIVINE RELATIONS � QUESTION 29. THE DIVINE PERSONS � QUESTION 30. THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (2 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. � QUESTION 31. OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD � QUESTION 32. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS � QUESTION 33. OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER � QUESTION 34. OF THE PERSON OF THE SON � QUESTION 35. OF THE IMAGE � QUESTION 36. OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST � QUESTION 37. OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE � QUESTION 38. OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT � QUESTION 39. OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE � QUESTION 40. OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES � QUESTION 41. OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS � QUESTION 42. OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS � QUESTION 43. THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (3 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. � QUESTION 44. THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS � QUESTION 45. THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE � QUESTION 46. OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES � QUESTION 47. OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL � QUESTION 48. THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR � QUESTION 49. THE CAUSE OF EVIL � QUESTION 50. OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED � QUESTION 51. OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES � QUESTION 52. OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE � QUESTION 53. OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS � QUESTION 54. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS � QUESTION 55. OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE � QUESTION 56. OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (4 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. � QUESTION 57. OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS � QUESTION 58. OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE � QUESTION 59. THE WILL OF THE ANGELS � QUESTION 60. OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS � QUESTION 61. OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING � QUESTION 62. OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY � QUESTION 63. THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN � QUESTION 64. THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS � QUESTION 65. THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES � QUESTION 66. ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION � QUESTION 67. ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF � QUESTION 68. ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY � QUESTION 69. ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (5 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. DAY � QUESTION 70. OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY � QUESTION 71. ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY � QUESTION 72. ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY � QUESTION 73. ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY � QUESTION 74. ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON � QUESTION 75. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL � QUESTION 76. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL � QUESTION 77. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL � QUESTION 78. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL � QUESTION 79. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS � QUESTION 80. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (6 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. IN GENERAL � QUESTION 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY � QUESTION 82. OF THE WILL � QUESTION 83. OF FREE-WILL � QUESTION 84. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT � QUESTION 85. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING � QUESTION 86. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS � QUESTION 87. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF � QUESTION 88. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF � QUESTION 89. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL � QUESTION 90. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL � QUESTION 91. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY � QUESTION 92. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (7 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. � QUESTION 93. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN � QUESTION 94. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT � QUESTION 95. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL, NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS � QUESTION 96. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE � QUESTION 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE � QUESTION 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES � QUESTION 99. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY � QUESTION 100. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS � QUESTION 101. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE � QUESTION 102. OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE � QUESTION 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL � QUESTION 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (8 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. � QUESTION 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD � QUESTION 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER � QUESTION 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS � QUESTION 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS � QUESTION 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS � QUESTION 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES � QUESTION 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN � QUESTION 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS � QUESTION 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS � QUESTION 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS � QUESTION 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE � QUESTION 116. ON FATE � QUESTION 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...ri/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (9 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province :Index. � QUESTION 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL � QUESTION 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20P...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/0-PrimaPars.htm (10 of 10)2006-06-02 23:23:43 PRIMAPARS: PROLOGUE, Index. PROLOGUE Index PROLOGUE file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars0.htm2006-06-02 23:23:44 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 1 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE, Index. QUESTION 1 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE Index PROLOGUE ARTICLE 1. Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required? ARTICLE 2. Whether sacred doctrine is a science? ARTICLE 3. Whether sacred doctrine is one science? ARTICLE 4. Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science? ARTICLE 5. Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences? ARTICLE 6. Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom? ARTICLE 7. Whether God is the object of this science? ARTICLE 8. Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument? ARTICLE 9. Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors? ARTICLE 10. Whether in Holy Scripture a word may file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:44 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 1 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE, Index. have several senses? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:44 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 2 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 2 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Index PROLOGUE ARTICLE 1. Whether the existence of God is self�evident? ARTICLE 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists? ARTICLE 3. Whether God exists? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars2.htm2006-06-02 23:23:44 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 3 OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 3 OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether God is a body? ARTICLE 2. Whether God is composed of matter and form? ARTICLE 3. Whether God is the same as His essence or nature? ARTICLE 4. Whether essence and existence are the same in God? ARTICLE 5. Whether God is contained in a genus? ARTICLE 6. Whether in God there are any accidents? ARTICLE 7. Whether God is altogether simple? ARTICLE 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars3.htm2006-06-02 23:23:44 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 4 THE PERFECTION OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 4 THE PERFECTION OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether God is perfect? ARTICLE 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God? ARTICLE 3. Whether any creature can be like God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars4.htm2006-06-02 23:23:44 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 5 OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL, Index. QUESTION 5 OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether goodness differs really from being? ARTICLE 2. Whether goodness is prior in idea to being? ARTICLE 3. Whether every being is good? ARTICLE 4. Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause? ARTICLE 5. Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order? ARTICLE 6. Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars5.htm2006-06-02 23:23:45 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 6 THE GOODNESS OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 6 THE GOODNESS OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether God is good? ARTICLE 2. Whether God is the supreme good? ARTICLE 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone? ARTICLE 4. Whether all things are good by the divine goodness? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars6.htm2006-06-02 23:23:45 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 7 THE INFINITY OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 7 THE INFINITY OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether God is infinite? ARTICLE 2. Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite? ARTICLE 3. Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist? ARTICLE 4. Whether an infinite multitude can exist? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars7.htm2006-06-02 23:23:45 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 8 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS, Index. QUESTION 8 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether God is in all things? ARTICLE 2. Whether God is everywhere? ARTICLE 3. Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power? ARTICLE 4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars8.htm2006-06-02 23:23:45 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 9 THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 9 THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether God is altogether immutable? ARTICLE 2. Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars9.htm2006-06-02 23:23:45 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 10 THE ETERNITY OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 10 THE ETERNITY OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"? ARTICLE 2. Whether God is eternal? ARTICLE 3. Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? ARTICLE 4. Whether eternity differs from time? ARTICLE 5. The difference of aeviternity and time. ARTICLE 6. Whether there is only one aeviternity? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars10.htm2006-06-02 23:23:46 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 11 THE UNITY OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 11 THE UNITY OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether "one" adds anything to "being"? ARTICLE 2. Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other? ARTICLE 3. Whether God is one? ARTICLE 4. Whether God is supremely one? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars11.htm2006-06-02 23:23:46 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 12 HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US, Index. QUESTION 12 HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? ARTICLE 2. Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image? ARTICLE 3. Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye? ARTICLE 4. Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence? ARTICLE 5. Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? ARTICLE 6. Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another? ARTICLE 7. Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him? ARTICLE 8. Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God? ARTICLE 9. Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars12.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:46 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 12 HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US, Index. ARTICLE 10. Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time? ARTICLE 11. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God? ARTICLE 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason? ARTICLE 13. Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars12.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:46 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 13 THE NAMES OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 13 THE NAMES OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether a name can be given to God? ARTICLE 2. Whether any name can be applied to God substantially? ARTICLE 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense? ARTICLE 4. Whether names applied to God are synonymous? ARTICLE 5. Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them? ARTICLE 6. Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures? ARTICLE 7. Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally? ARTICLE 8. Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature? ARTICLE 9. Whether this name "God" is communicable? ARTICLE 10. Whether this name "God" is applied to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars13.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:46 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 13 THE NAMES OF GOD, Index. God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion? ARTICLE 11. Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God? ARTICLE 12. Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars13.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:46 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 14 OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE, Index. QUESTION 14 OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is knowledge? ARTICLE 2. Whether God understands Himself? ARTICLE 3. Whether God comprehends Himself? ARTICLE 4. Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance? ARTICLE 5. Whether God knows things other than Himself? ARTICLE 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge? ARTICLE 7. Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? ARTICLE 8. Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? ARTICLE 9. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not? ARTICLE 10. Whether God knows evil things? ARTICLE 11. Whether God knows singular things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars14.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:47 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 14 OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE, Index. ARTICLE 12. Whether God can know infinite things? ARTICLE 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? ARTICLE 14. Whether God knows enunciable things? ARTICLE 15. Whether the knowledge of God is variable? ARTICLE 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars14.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:47 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 15 OF IDEAS, Index. QUESTION 15 OF IDEAS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there are ideas? ARTICLE 2. Whether ideas are many? ARTICLE 3. Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars15.htm2006-06-02 23:23:47 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 16 OF TRUTH, Index. QUESTION 16 OF TRUTH Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect? ARTICLE 2. Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? ARTICLE 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms? ARTICLE 4. Whether good is logically prior to the true? ARTICLE 5. Whether God is truth? ARTICLE 6. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true? ARTICLE 7. Whether created truth is eternal? ARTICLE 8. Whether truth is immutable? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars16.htm2006-06-02 23:23:47 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 17 CONCERNING FALSITY, Index. QUESTION 17 CONCERNING FALSITY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether falsity exists in things? ARTICLE 2. Whether there is falsity in the senses? ARTICLE 3. Whether falsity is in the intellect? ARTICLE 4. Whether true and false are contraries? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars17.htm2006-06-02 23:23:47 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 18 THE LIFE OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 18 THE LIFE OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether to live belongs to all natural things? ARTICLE 2. Whether life is an operation? ARTICLE 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God? ARTICLE 4. Whether all things are life in God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars18.htm2006-06-02 23:23:48 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 19 THE WILL OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 19 THE WILL OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is will in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether God wills things apart from Himself? ARTICLE 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily? ARTICLE 4. Whether the will of God is the cause of things? ARTICLE 5. Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will? ARTICLE 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled? ARTICLE 7. Whether the will of God is changeable? ARTICLE 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed? ARTICLE 9. Whether God wills evils? ARTICLE 10. Whether God has free-will? ARTICLE 11. Whether the will of expression is to be file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars19.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:48 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 19 THE WILL OF GOD, Index. distinguished in God? ARTICLE 12. Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars19.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:48 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 20 GOD'S LOVE, Index. QUESTION 20 GOD'S LOVE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether love exists in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether God loves all things? ARTICLE 3. Whether God loves all things equally? ARTICLE 4. Whether God always loves more the better things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars20.htm2006-06-02 23:23:48 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 21 THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 21 THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is justice in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether the justice of God is truth? ARTICLE 3. Whether mercy can be attributed to God? ARTICLE 4. Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars21.htm2006-06-02 23:23:48 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 22 THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 22 THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God? ARTICLE 2. Whether everything is subject to the providence of God? ARTICLE 3. Whether God has immediate providence over everything? ARTICLE 4. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars22.htm2006-06-02 23:23:48 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 23 OF PREDESTINATION, Index. QUESTION 23 OF PREDESTINATION Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether men are predestined by God? ARTICLE 2. Whether predestination places anything in the predestined? ARTICLE 3. Whether God reprobates any man? ARTICLE 4. Whether the predestined are chosen by God? ARTICLE 5. Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination? ARTICLE 6. Whether predestination is certain? ARTICLE 7. Whether the number of the predestined is certain? ARTICLE 8. Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars23.htm2006-06-02 23:23:49 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 24 THE BOOK OF LIFE, Index. QUESTION 24 THE BOOK OF LIFE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the book of life is the same as predestination? ARTICLE 2. Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined? ARTICLE 3. Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars24.htm2006-06-02 23:23:49 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 25 THE POWER OF GOD, Index. QUESTION 25 THE POWER OF GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is power in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether the power of God is infinite? ARTICLE 3. Whether God is omnipotent? ARTICLE 4. Whether God can make the past not to have been? ARTICLE 5. Whether God can do what He does not? ARTICLE 6. Whether God can do better than what He does? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars25.htm2006-06-02 23:23:49 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 26 OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE, Index. QUESTION 26 OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether beatitude belongs to God? ARTICLE 2. Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect? ARTICLE 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed? ARTICLE 4. Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars26.htm2006-06-02 23:23:49 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 27 THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS, Index. QUESTION 27 THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is procession in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether any procession in God can be called generation? ARTICLE 3. Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word? ARTICLE 4. Whether the procession of love in God is generation? ARTICLE 5. Whether there are more than two processions in God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars27.htm2006-06-02 23:23:49 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 28 THE DIVINE RELATIONS, Index. QUESTION 28 THE DIVINE RELATIONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there are real relations in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether relation in God is the same as His essence? ARTICLE 3. Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other? ARTICLE 4. Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars28.htm2006-06-02 23:23:50 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 29 THE DIVINE PERSONS, Index. QUESTION 29 THE DIVINE PERSONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. The definition of "person". ARTICLE 2. Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence? ARTICLE 3. Whether the word "person" should be said of God? ARTICLE 4. Whether this word "person" signifies relation? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars29.htm2006-06-02 23:23:50 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 30 THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD, Index. QUESTION 30 THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there are several persons in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether there are more than three persons in God? ARTICLE 3. Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God? ARTICLE 4. Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars30.htm2006-06-02 23:23:50 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 31 OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD, Index. QUESTION 31 OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is trinity in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether the Son is other than the Father? ARTICLE 3. Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in God? ARTICLE 4. Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars31.htm2006-06-02 23:23:50 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 32 THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS, Index. QUESTION 32 THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason? ARTICLE 2. Whether there are notions in God? ARTICLE 3. Whether there are five notions? ARTICLE 4. Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars32.htm2006-06-02 23:23:50 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 33 OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER, Index. QUESTION 33 OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle? ARTICLE 2. Whether this name "Father" is properly the name of a divine person? ARTICLE 3. Whether this name "Father" is applied to God, firstly as a personal name? ARTICLE 4. Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars33.htm2006-06-02 23:23:51 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 34 OF THE PERSON OF THE SON, Index. QUESTION 34 OF THE PERSON OF THE SON Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether Word in God is a personal name? ARTICLE 2. Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name? ARTICLE 3. Whether the name "Word" imports relation to creatures? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars34.htm2006-06-02 23:23:51 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 35 OF THE IMAGE, Index. QUESTION 35 OF THE IMAGE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether image in God is said personally? ARTICLE 2. Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars35.htm2006-06-02 23:23:51 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 36 OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST, Index. QUESTION 36 OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether this name "Holy Ghost" is the proper name of one divine person? ARTICLE 2. Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son? ARTICLE 3. Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son? ARTICLE 4. Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars36.htm2006-06-02 23:23:51 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 37 OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE, Index. QUESTION 37 OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? ARTICLE 2. Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars37.htm2006-06-02 23:23:52 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 38 OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT, Index. QUESTION 38 OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether "Gift" is a personal name? ARTICLE 2. Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars38.htm2006-06-02 23:23:52 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 39 OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE, Index. QUESTION 39 OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? ARTICLE 2. Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence? ARTICLE 3. Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons? ARTICLE 4. Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person? ARTICLE 5. Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person? ARTICLE 6. Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms? ARTICLE 7. Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons? ARTICLE 8. Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars39.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:52 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 39 OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars39.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:52 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 40 OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES, Index. QUESTION 40 OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether relation is the same as person? ARTICLE 2. Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations? ARTICLE 3. Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons? ARTICLE 4. Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars40.htm2006-06-02 23:23:52 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 41 OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS, Index. QUESTION 41 OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons? ARTICLE 2. Whether the notional acts are voluntary? ARTICLE 3. Whether the notional acts proceed from something? ARTICLE 4. Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts? ARTICLE 5. Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence? ARTICLE 6. Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars41.htm2006-06-02 23:23:52 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 42 OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS, Index. QUESTION 42 OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is equality in God? ARTICLE 2. Whether the person proceeding is co�eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father? ARTICLE 3. Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature? ARTICLE 4. Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness? ARTICLE 5. Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely? ARTICLE 6. Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars42.htm2006-06-02 23:23:53 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 43 THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS, Index. QUESTION 43 THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether a divine person can be properly sent? ARTICLE 2. Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal? ARTICLE 3. Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace? ARTICLE 4. Whether the Father can be fittingly sent? ARTICLE 5. Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly? ARTICLE 6. Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace? ARTICLE 7. Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly? ARTICLE 8. Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars43.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:53 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 43 THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars43.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:53 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 44 THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS, Index. QUESTION 44 THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God? ARTICLE 2. Whether primary matter is created by God? ARTICLE 3. Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God? ARTICLE 4. Whether God is the final cause of all things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars44.htm2006-06-02 23:23:53 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 45 THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE, Index. QUESTION 45 THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether to create is to make something from nothing? ARTICLE 2. Whether God can create anything? ARTICLE 3. Whether creation is anything in the creature? ARTICLE 4. Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things? ARTICLE 5. Whether it belongs to God alone to create? ARTICLE 6. Whether to create is proper to any person? ARTICLE 7. Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity? ARTICLE 8. Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars45.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:53 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 45 THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars45.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:53 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 46 OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES, Index. QUESTION 46 OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the universe of creatures always existed? ARTICLE 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began? ARTICLE 3. Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars46.htm2006-06-02 23:23:54 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 47 OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL, Index. QUESTION 47 OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God? ARTICLE 2. Whether the inequality of things is from God? ARTICLE 3. Whether there is only one world? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars47.htm2006-06-02 23:23:54 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 48 THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR, Index. QUESTION 48 THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether evil is a nature? ARTICLE 2. Whether evil is found in things? ARTICLE 3. Whether evil is in good as in its subject? ARTICLE 4. Whether evil corrupts the whole good? ARTICLE 5. Whether evil is adequately divided into pain and fault? ARTICLE 6. Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars48.htm2006-06-02 23:23:54 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 49 THE CAUSE OF EVIL, Index. QUESTION 49 THE CAUSE OF EVIL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether good can be the cause of evil? ARTICLE 2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil? ARTICLE 3. Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars49.htm2006-06-02 23:23:54 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 50 OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED, Index. QUESTION 50 OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal? ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel is composed of matter and form? ARTICLE 3. Whether the angels exist in any great number? ARTICLE 4. Whether the angels differ in species? ARTICLE 5. Whether the angels are incorruptible? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars50.htm2006-06-02 23:23:54 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 51 OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES, Index. QUESTION 51 OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them? ARTICLE 2. Whether angels assume bodies? ARTICLE 3. Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars51.htm2006-06-02 23:23:55 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 52 OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE, Index. QUESTION 52 OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel is in a place? ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel can be in several places at once? ARTICLE 3. Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars52.htm2006-06-02 23:23:55 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 53 OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 53 OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel can be moved locally? ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel passes through intermediate space? ARTICLE 3. Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars53.htm2006-06-02 23:23:55 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 54 OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 54 OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel's act of understanding is his substance? ARTICLE 2. Whether in the angel to understand is to exist? ARTICLE 3. Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence? ARTICLE 4. Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel? ARTICLE 5. Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars54.htm2006-06-02 23:23:55 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 55 OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE, Index. QUESTION 55 OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels know all things by their substance? ARTICLE 2. Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things? ARTICLE 3. Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars55.htm2006-06-02 23:23:56 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 56 OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS, Index. QUESTION 56 OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel knows himself? ARTICLE 2. Whether one angel knows another? ARTICLE 3. Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars56.htm2006-06-02 23:23:56 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 57 OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS, Index. QUESTION 57 OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels know material things? ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel knows singulars? ARTICLE 3. Whether angels know the future? ARTICLE 4. Whether angels know secret thoughts? ARTICLE 5. Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars57.htm2006-06-02 23:23:56 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 58 OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE, Index. QUESTION 58 OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in act? ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time? ARTICLE 3. Whether an angel's knowledge is discursive? ARTICLE 4. Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing? ARTICLE 5. Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel? ARTICLE 6. Whether there is a "morning" and an "evening" knowledge in the angels? ARTICLE 7. Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars58.htm2006-06-02 23:23:56 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 59 THE WILL OF THE ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 59 THE WILL OF THE ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is will in the angels? ARTICLE 2. Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect? ARTICLE 3. Whether there is free-will in the angels? ARTICLE 4. Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars59.htm2006-06-02 23:23:56 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 60 OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 60 OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel? ARTICLE 2. Whether there is love of choice in the angels? ARTICLE 3. Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice? ARTICLE 4. Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself? ARTICLE 5. Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars60.htm2006-06-02 23:23:57 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 61 OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING, Index. QUESTION 61 OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels have a cause of their existence? ARTICLE 2. Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity? ARTICLE 3. Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world? ARTICLE 4. Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars61.htm2006-06-02 23:23:57 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 62 OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY, Index. QUESTION 62 OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels were created in beatitude? ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God? ARTICLE 3. Whether the angels were created in grace? ARTICLE 4. Whether an angel merits his beatitude? ARTICLE 5. Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit? ARTICLE 6. Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts? ARTICLE 7. Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels? ARTICLE 8. Whether a beatified angel can sin? ARTICLE 9. Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars62.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:57 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 62 OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars62.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:57 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 63 THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN, Index. QUESTION 63 THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels? ARTICLE 2. Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel? ARTICLE 3. Whether the devil desired to be as God? ARTICLE 4. Whether any demons are naturally wicked? ARTICLE 5. Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation? ARTICLE 6. Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel? ARTICLE 7. Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all? ARTICLE 8. Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning? ARTICLE 9. Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars63.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:57 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 63 THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars63.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:23:57 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 64 THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS, Index. QUESTION 64 THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the demons' intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth? ARTICLE 2. Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil? ARTICLE 3. Whether there is sorrow in the demons? ARTICLE 4. Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars64.htm2006-06-02 23:23:58 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 65 THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES, Index. QUESTION 65 THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether corporeal creatures are from God? ARTICLE 2. Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness? ARTICLE 3. Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels? ARTICLE 4. Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars65.htm2006-06-02 23:23:58 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 66 ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION, Index. QUESTION 66 ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation? ARTICLE 2. Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same? ARTICLE 3. Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter? ARTICLE 4. Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars66.htm2006-06-02 23:23:58 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 67 ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF, Index. QUESTION 67 ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things? ARTICLE 2. Whether light is a body? ARTICLE 3. Whether light is a quality? ARTICLE 4. Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars67.htm2006-06-02 23:23:58 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 68 ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY, Index. QUESTION 68 ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the firmament was made on the second day? ARTICLE 2. Whether there are waters above the firmament? ARTICLE 3. Whether the firmament divides waters from waters? ARTICLE 4. Whether there is only one heaven? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars68.htm2006-06-02 23:23:58 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 69 ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY, Index. QUESTION 69 ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day? ARTICLE 2. Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars69.htm2006-06-02 23:23:59 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 70 OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY, Index. QUESTION 70 OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day? ARTICLE 2. Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable? ARTICLE 3. Whether the lights of heaven are living beings? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars70.htm2006-06-02 23:23:59 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 71 ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY, Index. QUESTION 71 ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY Index ARTICLE UNIQUE file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars71.htm2006-06-02 23:23:59 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 72 ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY, Index. QUESTION 72 ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY Index ARTICLE UNIQUE file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars72.htm2006-06-02 23:23:59 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 73 ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY, Index. QUESTION 73 ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day? ARTICLE 2. Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work? ARTICLE 3. Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars73.htm2006-06-02 23:24:00 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 74 ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON, Index. QUESTION 74 ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated? ARTICLE 2. Whether all these days are one day? ARTICLE 3. Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars74.htm2006-06-02 23:24:00 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 75 OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRI...ERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL, Index. QUESTION 75 OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the soul is a body? ARTICLE 2. Whether the human soul is something subsistent? ARTICLE 3. Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent? ARTICLE 4. Whether the soul is man? ARTICLE 5. Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? ARTICLE 6. Whether the human soul is incorruptible? ARTICLE 7. Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars75.htm2006-06-02 23:24:00 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 76 OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL, Index. QUESTION 76 OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form? ARTICLE 2. Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies? ARTICLE 3. Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another? ARTICLE 4. Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul? ARTICLE 5. Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body? ARTICLE 6. Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions? ARTICLE 7. Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body? ARTICLE 8. Whether the soul is in each part of the body? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars76.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:00 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 76 OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars76.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:00 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 77 OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL, Index. QUESTION 77 OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the essence of the soul is its power? ARTICLE 2. Whether there are several powers of the soul? ARTICLE 3. Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? ARTICLE 4. Whether among the powers of the soul there is order? ARTICLE 5. Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject? ARTICLE 6. Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence? ARTICLE 7. Whether one power of the soul arises from another? ARTICLE 8. Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars77.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:01 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 77 OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars77.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:01 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 78 OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL, Index. QUESTION 78 OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul? ARTICLE 2. Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative? ARTICLE 3. Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished? ARTICLE 4. Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars78.htm2006-06-02 23:24:01 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 79 OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS, Index. QUESTION 79 OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the intellect is a power of the soul? ARTICLE 2. Whether the intellect is a passive power? ARTICLE 3. Whether there is an active intellect? ARTICLE 4. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul? ARTICLE 5. Whether the active intellect is one in all? ARTICLE 6. Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul? ARTICLE 7. Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect? ARTICLE 8. Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect? ARTICLE 9. Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers? ARTICLE 10. Whether intelligence is a power file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars79.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:01 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 79 OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS, Index. distinct from intellect? ARTICLE 11. Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers? ARTICLE 12. Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the thers? ARTICLE 13. Whether conscience be a power? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars79.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:01 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 80 OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL, Index. QUESTION 80 OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul? ARTICLE 2. Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars80.htm2006-06-02 23:24:01 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 81 OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY, Index. QUESTION 81 OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether sensuality is only appetitive? ARTICLE 2. Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? ARTICLE 3. Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars81.htm2006-06-02 23:24:01 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 82 OF THE WILL, Index. QUESTION 82 OF THE WILL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the will desires something of necessity? ARTICLE 2. Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires? ARTICLE 3. Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? ARTICLE 4. Whether the will moves the intellect? ARTICLE 5. Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars82.htm2006-06-02 23:24:02 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 83 OF FREE-WILL, Index. QUESTION 83 OF FREE-WILL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether man has free-will? ARTICLE 2. Whether free-will is a power? ARTICLE 3. Whether free-will is an appetitive power? ARTICLE 4. Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars83.htm2006-06-02 23:24:02 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 84 HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT, Index. QUESTION 84 HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect? ARTICLE 2. Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence? ARTICLE 3. Whether the soul understands all things through innate species? ARTICLE 4. Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms? ARTICLE 5. Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types? ARTICLE 6. Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things? ARTICLE 7. Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms? ARTICLE 8. Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars84.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:02 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 84 HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars84.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:02 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 85 OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING, Index. QUESTION 85 OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms? ARTICLE 2. Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood? ARTICLE 3. Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition? ARTICLE 4. Whether we can understand many things at the same time? ARTICLE 5. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division? ARTICLE 6. Whether the intellect can be false? ARTICLE 7. Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can? ARTICLE 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars85.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:02 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 85 OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars85.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:02 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 86 WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS, Index. QUESTION 86 WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether our intellect knows singulars? ARTICLE 2. Whether our intellect can know the infinite? ARTICLE 3. Whether our intellect can know contingent things? ARTICLE 4. Whether our intellect can know the future? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars86.htm2006-06-02 23:24:03 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 87 HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF, Index. QUESTION 87 HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence? ARTICLE 2. Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence? ARTICLE 3. Whether our intellect knows its own act? ARTICLE 4. Whether the intellect understands the act of the will? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars87.htm2006-06-02 23:24:03 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 88 HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF, Index. QUESTION 88 HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves? ARTICLE 2. Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things? ARTICLE 3. Whether God is the first object known by the human mind? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars88.htm2006-06-02 23:24:03 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 89 OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL, Index. QUESTION 89 OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the separated soul can understand anything? ARTICLE 2. Whether the separated soul understands separate substances? ARTICLE 3. Whether the separated soul knows all natural things? ARTICLE 4. Whether the separated soul knows singulars? ARTICLE 5. Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul? ARTICLE 6. Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul? ARTICLE 7. Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul? ARTICLE 8. Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars89.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:03 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 89 OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars89.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:03 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 90 OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL, Index. QUESTION 90 OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance? ARTICLE 2. Whether the soul was produced by creation? ARTICLE 3. Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately? ARTICLE 4. Whether the human soul was produced before the body? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars90.htm2006-06-02 23:24:03 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 91 THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY, Index. QUESTION 91 THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth? ARTICLE 2. Whether the human body was immediately produced by God? ARTICLE 3. Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition? ARTICLE 4. Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars91.htm2006-06-02 23:24:04 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 92 THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN, Index. QUESTION 92 THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things? ARTICLE 2. Whether woman should have been made from man? ARTICLE 3. Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man? ARTICLE 4. Whether the woman was formed immediately by God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars92.htm2006-06-02 23:24:04 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 93 THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN, Index. QUESTION 93 THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the image of God is in man? ARTICLE 2. Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures? ARTICLE 3. Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is? ARTICLE 4. Whether the image of God is found in every man? ARTICLE 5. Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons? ARTICLE 6. Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only? ARTICLE 7. Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul? ARTICLE 8. Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object? ARTICLE 9. Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars93.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:04 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 93 THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars93.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:04 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 94 OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT, Index. QUESTION 94 OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the first man saw God through His Essence? ARTICLE 2. Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence? ARTICLE 3. Whether the first man knew all things? ARTICLE 4. Whether man in his first state could be deceived? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars94.htm2006-06-02 23:24:04 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 95 OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL, NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS, Index. QUESTION 95 OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL, NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the first man was created in grace? ARTICLE 2. Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man? ARTICLE 3. Whether Adam had all the virtues? ARTICLE 4. Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars95.htm2006-06-02 23:24:05 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 96 OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE, Index. QUESTION 96 OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals? ARTICLE 2. Whether man had mastership over all other creatures? ARTICLE 3. Whether men were equal in the state of innocence? ARTICLE 4. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars96.htm2006-06-02 23:24:05 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 97 OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE, Index. QUESTION 97 OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal? ARTICLE 2. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible? ARTICLE 3. Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food? ARTICLE 4. Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars97.htm2006-06-02 23:24:05 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 98 OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES, Index. QUESTION 98 OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether in the state of innocence generation existed? ARTICLE 2. Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars98.htm2006-06-02 23:24:05 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 99 OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY, Index. QUESTION 99 OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth? ARTICLE 2. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars99.htm2006-06-02 23:24:05 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 100 OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS, Index. QUESTION 100 OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? ARTICLE 2. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars100.htm2006-06-02 23:24:06 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 101 OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE, Index. QUESTION 101 OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? ARTICLE 2. Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars101.htm2006-06-02 23:24:06 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 102 OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE, Index. QUESTION 102 OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether paradise is a corporeal place? ARTICLE 2. Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man? ARTICLE 3. Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it? ARTICLE 4. Whether man was created in paradise? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars102.htm2006-06-02 23:24:06 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 103 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL, Index. QUESTION 103 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the world is governed by anyone? ARTICLE 2. Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world? ARTICLE 3. Whether the world is governed by one? ARTICLE 4. Whether the effect of government is one or many? ARTICLE 5. Whether all things are subject to the Divine government? ARTICLE 6. Whether all things are immediately governed by God? ARTICLE 7. Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government? ARTICLE 8. Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars103.htm2006-06-02 23:24:06 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 104 THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT, Index. QUESTION 104 THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God? ARTICLE 2. Whether God preserves every creature immediately? ARTICLE 3. Whether God can annihilate anything? ARTICLE 4. Whether anything is annihilated? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars104.htm2006-06-02 23:24:07 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 105 OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD, Index. QUESTION 105 OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form? ARTICLE 2. Whether God can move a body immediately? ARTICLE 3. Whether God moves the created intellect immediately? ARTICLE 4. Whether God can move the created will? ARTICLE 5. Whether God works in every agent? ARTICLE 6. Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature? ARTICLE 7. Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous? ARTICLE 8. Whether one miracle is greater than another? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars105.htm2006-06-02 23:24:07 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 106 HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER, Index. QUESTION 106 HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether one angel enlightens another? ARTICLE 2. Whether one angel moves another angel's will? ARTICLE 3. Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? ARTICLE 4. Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars106.htm2006-06-02 23:24:07 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 107 THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 107 THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether one angel speaks to another? ARTICLE 2. Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior? ARTICLE 3. Whether an angel speaks to God? ARTICLE 4. Whether local distance influences the angelic speech? ARTICLE 5. Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars107.htm2006-06-02 23:24:07 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 108 OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS, Index. QUESTION 108 OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy? ARTICLE 2. Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy? ARTICLE 3. Whether there are many angels in one order? ARTICLE 4. Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature? ARTICLE 5. Whether the orders of the angels are properly named? ARTICLE 6. Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned? ARTICLE 7. Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment? ARTICLE 8. Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars108.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:07 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 108 OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars108.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:07 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 109 THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 109 THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there are orders among the demons? ARTICLE 2. Whether among the demons there is precedence? ARTICLE 3. Whether there is enlightenment in the demons? ARTICLE 4. Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars109.htm2006-06-02 23:24:08 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 110 HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES, Index. QUESTION 110 HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? ARTICLE 2. Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel? ARTICLE 3. Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion? ARTICLE 4. Whether angels can work miracles? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars110.htm2006-06-02 23:24:08 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 111 THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN, Index. QUESTION 111 THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel can enlighten man? ARTICLE 2. Whether the angels can change the will of man? ARTICLE 3. Whether an angel can change man's imagination? ARTICLE 4. Whether an angel can change the human senses? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars111.htm2006-06-02 23:24:08 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 112 THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 112 THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry? ARTICLE 2. Whether all the angels are sent in ministry? ARTICLE 3. Whether all the angels who are sent, assist? ARTICLE 4. Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars112.htm2006-06-02 23:24:08 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 113 OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS, Index. QUESTION 113 OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether men are guarded by the angels? ARTICLE 2. Whether each man is guarded by an angel? ARTICLE 3. Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels? ARTICLE 4. Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men? ARTICLE 5. Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth? ARTICLE 6. Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man? ARTICLE 7. Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard? ARTICLE 8. Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars113.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:09 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 113 OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS, Index. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars113.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:09 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 114 OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS, Index. QUESTION 114 OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether men are assailed by the demons? ARTICLE 2. Whether to tempt is proper to the devil? ARTICLE 3. Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil? ARTICLE 4. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles? ARTICLE 5. Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars114.htm2006-06-02 23:24:09 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 115 OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE, Index. QUESTION 115 OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether a body can be active? ARTICLE 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter? ARTICLE 3. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below? ARTICLE 4. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions? ARTICLE 5. Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons? ARTICLE 6. Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars115.htm2006-06-02 23:24:09 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 116 ON FATE, Index. QUESTION 116 ON FATE Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether there be such a thing as fate? ARTICLE 2. Whether fate is in created things? ARTICLE 3. Whether fate is unchangeable? ARTICLE 4. Whether all things are subject to fate? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars116.htm2006-06-02 23:24:09 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 117 OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN, Index. QUESTION 117 OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether one man can teach another? ARTICLE 2. Whether man can teach the angels? ARTICLE 3. Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter? ARTICLE 4. Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars117.htm2006-06-02 23:24:09 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 118 OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL, Index. QUESTION 118 OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen? ARTICLE 2. Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen? ARTICLE 3. Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars118.htm2006-06-02 23:24:10 PRIMAPARS: QUESTION 119 OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY, Index. QUESTION 119 OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY Index Prologue ARTICLE 1. Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature? ARTICLE 2. Whether the semen is produced from surplus food? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/1-PrimaPars119.htm2006-06-02 23:24:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.0, C.1. St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province PROLOGUE Because the doctor of Catholic truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle: As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat -- 1 Cor. 3:1-2), we purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this doctrine have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments, partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject matter, but according as the plan of the book might require, or the occasion of the argument offer, partly, too, because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of readers. Endeavouring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this sacred doctrine as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars0-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.1. St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA FIRST PART QUESTION 1 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE PROLOGUE To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is necessary? (2) Whether it is a science? (3) Whether it is one or many? (4) Whether it is speculative or practical? (5) How it is compared with other sciences? (6) Whether it is the same as wisdom? (7) Whether God is its subject-matter? (8) Whether it is a matter of argument? (9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes? (10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.1. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required? Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous. Objection 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science---even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge. On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God. I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Is. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.2. might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation. Reply to Objection 1: Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the sacred science consists. Reply to Objection 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e. abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether sacred doctrine is a science? Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2 Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. Objection 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened." But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science. I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God. Reply to Objection 1: The principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred doctrine. Reply to Objection 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.3. scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether sacred doctrine is one science? Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator and the creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one science. Objection 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science. On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom gave him the knowledge of holy things" (Wis. 10:10). I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science. Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired. Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the "common sense" is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible. Hence the "common sense," although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of different file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.4. philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science? Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for a practical science is that which ends in action according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22). Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science. Objection 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science. Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science. On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science. I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-5.htm2006-06-02 23:24:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences? Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles---namely, articles of faith---can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler. Objection 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences. On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one: "Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3). I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.6. Reply to Objection 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun" (Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi. Reply to Objection 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom? Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph. i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not wisdom. Objection 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom. Objection 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Is. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause---not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him---"That which is known of God is manifest in them" (Rm. 1:19)---but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.7. Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order. Reply to Objection 2: The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2 Cor. 10:4,5). Reply to Objection 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things." The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether God is the object of this science? Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God." Therefore God is not the object of this science. Objection 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the object of this science. On the contrary, The object of the science is that of which it principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this science. I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God--- that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God. Reply to Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-8.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.8. effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause. Reply to Objection 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or accidents but as in some way related to Him. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-8.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument? Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought." But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are written that you may believe" (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument. Objection 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience." Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument. On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9). I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-9.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.9. objections---if he has any---against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered. Reply to Objection 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths. Reply to Objection 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-9.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.9. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-9.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.10. ARTICLE 9. Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors? Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes. Objection 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science. Objection 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in Scriptures. On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets." But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors. I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without distinction of persons---"To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rm. 1:14)--- that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-10.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.10. understand it. Reply to Objection 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful. Reply to Objection 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to dogs" (Mt. 7:6). Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-10.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.11. ARTICLE 10. Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses? Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and allegory." Now these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four different senses mentioned above. Objection 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these four. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery." I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-11.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.11. the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses. Reply to Objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense. Reply to Objection 2: These three---history, etiology, analogy---are grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives---namely, on account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only---the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological. Reply to Objection 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-11.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.1, C.11. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars1-11.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.1. QUESTION 2 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD PROLOGUE Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God. In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him. Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations--- namely, His knowledge, will, power. Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident? (2) Whether it is demonstrable? (3) Whether God exists? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident? Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident. Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident. Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident. On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident. I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.2. the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self�evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Question 3, Article 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects. Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else. Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist. Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.2. but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists? Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists. Objection 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists. Objection 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists. I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us. Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.3. faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God". Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God exists? Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence. On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex. 3:14) I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways. The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-4.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.4. consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-4.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.4. speak of as God. The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God. The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good. Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-4.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.2, C.4. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars2-4.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.1. QUESTION 3 OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD Prologue When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not. Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named. Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity. Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body? (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident? (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.1. (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether God is a body? Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job 11:8,9). Therefore God is a body. Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body. Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps. 33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps. 117:16). Therefore God is a body. Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the Lord sitting" (Is. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Is. 3:13). Therefore God is a body. Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13). Therefore God is a body. On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit." I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (Question 2, Article 3), that God is the First file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.2. Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body. Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above (Question 1, Article 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection. Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea" (Gn. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.2. Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts. Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him. Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God is composed of matter and form? Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form. Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form. Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form. On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form. I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Question 2, Article 3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form. Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.3. resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul. Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger. Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God is the same as His essence or nature? Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead. On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn. 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead. I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.4. "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him. Reply to Objection 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God. Reply to Objection 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether essence and existence are the same in God? Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God's existence is not His essence. Objection 2: Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (Question 2, Article 2); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or nature. On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God is His existence. I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.5. in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (Article 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above (Article 3) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. Reply to Objection 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense. Reply to Objection 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is true; and this we know from His effects (Question 2, Article 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether God is contained in a genus? Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance. Objection 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance. On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus. I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.6. agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle. Reply to Objection 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance. Reply to Objection 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether in God there are any accidents? Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents. Objection 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is absurd. On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident. I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown (Question 2, Article 3). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God. Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.7. Reply to Objection 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether God is altogether simple? Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple. Objection 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple." I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (Question 2, Article 3). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Question 2, Article 3), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-8.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.8. volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim." Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Question 4, Article 3). Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (Question 4, Article 1 and Question 6, Article 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-8.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things? Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things. Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxxviii) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound. Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part." Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis). I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-9.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.3, C.9. thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Question 3, Article 1): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (Question 2, Article 3). Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence. Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound. Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars3-9.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.1. QUESTION 4 THE PERFECTION OF GOD Prologue Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness. Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is perfect? (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things? (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether God is perfect? Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect. Objection 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect. Objection 3: Further, as shown above (Question 3, Article 4), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect. On the contrary, It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt. 5:48). I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection. Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not. Reply to Objection 2: The material principle which with us is found to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.2. be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual. Reply to Objection 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God? Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (Question 3, Article 7); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. Objection 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. Objection 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one existence prepossesses all things." I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre�exists virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.3. Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (Question 3, Article 4). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things." Reply to Objection 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. Reply to Objection 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether any creature can be like God? Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God. Objection 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (Question 3, Article 5). Therefore no creature is like God. Objection 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God. Objection 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" (Is. 40:18). On the contrary, It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gn. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" (1 Jn. 3:2). I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.4. communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being. Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically. Reply to Objection 2: God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the principle of all "genera." Reply to Objection 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation. Reply to Objection 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.4, C.4. between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars4-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.1. QUESTION 5 OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL Prologue We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really? (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought? (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good? (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced? (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order? (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether goodness differs really from being? Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ. Objection 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being. Objection 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good." I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (Question 3, Article 4; Question 4, Article 1). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present. Reply to Objection 1: Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.2. white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being. Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality. Reply to Objection 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether goodness is prior in idea to being? Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. Objection 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being. Objection 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (Mt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. Objection 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being. On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being." I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness. Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.3. God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v). Reply to Objection 2: The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual. Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good. Reply to Objection 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.3. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether every being is good? Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from Article 1. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good. Objection 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (Is. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good. Objection 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good. Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good. On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good. I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from Article 1. Hence it follows that every being as such is good. Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being. Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.4. because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well. Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to desire. Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding article. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause? Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause. Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause. Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause. I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection. Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.5. fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause. Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move. Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order? Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession. Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three--- mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.6. unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order. I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above Articles 1,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order. Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good. Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white. Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.6. evil deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight. Reply to Objection 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous." Reply to Objection 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change, i.e. the heavens. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant? Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them. Objection 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect. Objection 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous. On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9) I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.5, C.7. sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant. Reply to Objection 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its proper formality. Reply to Objection 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves. Reply to Objection 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars5-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.1. QUESTION 6 THE GOODNESS OF GOD Prologue We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness belongs to God? (2) Whether God is the supreme good? (3) Whether He alone is essentially good? (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether God is good? Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. Objection 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him." I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist." Reply to Objection 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause. Reply to Objection 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (Question 4, Article 3). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God is the supreme good? Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (Question 3, Article 7). Therefore God is not the supreme good. Objection 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (Lk. 18:19): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good. Objection 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (Question 3, Article 5; Question 4, Article 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds." I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (Question 4, Article 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good. Reply to Objection 1: The supreme good does not add to good any file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.3. absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in comparison with it. Reply to Objection 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article. Reply to Objection 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone? Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; as we said above (Question 5, Article 1). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially. Objection 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially. Objection 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially. I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.4. wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (Question 3, Article 6); and He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially. Reply to Objection 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above. Reply to Objection 2: Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially. Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has some other goodness whereby it is good. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether all things are good by the divine goodness? Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God. Objection 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness. On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness. I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Question 84, Article 4) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation. Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.6, C.5. which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (Question 2, Article 3), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above (Question 4, Article 3). Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses. This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars6-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.1. QUESTION 7 THE INFINITY OF GOD Prologue After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite. Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is infinite? (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence? (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude? (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether God is infinite? Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 1). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite. Objection 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless." I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things. We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.2. contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above (Question 4, Article 1, Objection 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Question 3, Article 4), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect. From this appears the Reply to the First Objection. Reply to Objection 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article. Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the being of God is self�subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self�subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite? Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect. Objection 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite. Objection 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 8). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite. On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite. I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.3. Reply to Objection 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite. Reply to Objection 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body. Reply to Objection 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist? Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude. Objection 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite. Objection 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite. Objection 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite. On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude. I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.4. We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form. Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other. The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary. Reply to Objection 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite. Reply to Objection 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.4. there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite. Reply to Objection 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division. Reply to Objection 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether an infinite multitude can exist? Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist. Objection 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible. Objection 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible. On the contrary, It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21). I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.7, C.5. this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude. This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude. Reply to Objection 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity. Reply to Objection 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures. Reply to Objection 3: Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars7-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.1. QUESTION 8 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS Prologue Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is in all things? (2) Whether God is everywhere? (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence? (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether God is in all things? Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things. Objection 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He is in any place." Objection 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things. Objection 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore God is not in all things. On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to Is. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in us." Therefore God is in all things. I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (Question 7, Article 1). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.2. Reply to Objection 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article. Reply to Objection 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him. Reply to Objection 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature. Reply to Objection 4: In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God is everywhere? Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere. Objection 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere. Objection 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere. On the contrary, It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer. 23:24). I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place. Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power. Reply to Objection 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.3. the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place. Reply to Objection 3: A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power? Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power. Objection 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power. Objection 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power. Objection 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's existence in things. On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace". I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.4. this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Question 12). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power. But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things" (Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence. Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence. Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being. Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being. Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.4. was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence. Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another. Reply to Objection 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone? Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above (Question 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. Objection 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere. Objection 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. Objection 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone. Objection 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. Objection 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?" I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.5. whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self. Reply to Objection 1: The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence. Reply to Objection 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere. Reply to Objection 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them. Reply to Objection 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts. Reply to Objection 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally. Reply to Objection 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.8, C.5. sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars8-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.9, C.1. QUESTION 9 THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD Prologue We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is altogether immutable? (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars9-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.9, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether God is altogether immutable? Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable. Objection 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active" (Wis. 7:24). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable. Objection 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable. On the contrary, It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" (Malachi 3:6). I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (Question 3, Article 7) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable. Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars9-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.9, C.2. Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement. Reply to Objection 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light. Reply to Objection 3: These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars9-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.9, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone? Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God alone. Objection 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable. Objection 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable." I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars9-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.9, C.3. If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to not�white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non�existence; and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places--- which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above (Question 8, Article 2). Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars9-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.9, C.3. divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable. Reply to Objection 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement. Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place. Reply to Objection 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars9-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.1. QUESTION 10 THE ETERNITY OF GOD Prologue We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry: (1) What is eternity? (2) Whether God is eternal? (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? (4) Whether eternity differs from time? (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"? Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously�whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found. Objection 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence." Objection 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole." Objection 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rm. 16:25). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous. Objection 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect." Objection 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession. I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.2. in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity. Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end. Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole. Reply to Objection 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite. Reply to Objection 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement. Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing. Reply to Objection 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession. Reply to Objection 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.2. Reply to Objection 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word "possession." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God is eternal? Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal. Objection 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God. Objection 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal. Objection 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal. On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal." I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity. Reply to Objection 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.3. communicates His immutability. Reply to Objection 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i. e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole. Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone. Reply to Objection 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. Objection 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal fire" (Mt. 25:41). Therefore God is not the only eternal. Objection 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal. On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal. I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (Question 9, Article 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3). Reply to Objection 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.4. Reply to Objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for ever" (Ps. 80:16). Reply to Objection 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether eternity differs from time? Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time. Objection 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity. On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing. I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.5. while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time. Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so. Reply to Objection 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity. Reply to Objection 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time. Reply to Objection 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.5. motion. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.6. ARTICLE 5. The difference of aeviternity and time. Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity. Objection 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it is the same as time. Objection 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing. Objection 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity." I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity, and from time. Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.6. fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all. Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.6. are measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity. Reply to Objection 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it. Reply to Objection 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been. Reply to Objection 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether there is only one aeviternity? Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord." Objection 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. Objection 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. Objection 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity one only. I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things. Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-7.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.7. numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured. This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (Question 47, Article 2); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. Reply to Objection 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-7.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.10, C.7. Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity. Reply to Objection 3: All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together. Reply to Objection 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars10-7.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.1. QUESTION 11 THE UNITY OF GOD Prologue After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"? (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other? (3) Whether God is one? (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether "one" adds anything to "being"? Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore "one" adds something to "being." Objection 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore "one" is an addition to "being." Objection 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to "being." On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being." I answer that, "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being. Reply to Objection 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.2. the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity. Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle." Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other? Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude." Objection 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed to "multitude." Objection 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many." Objection 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed. On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other. I answer that, "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided. Reply to Objection 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.3. universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa. Reply to Objection 2: A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses. Reply to Objection 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense. Reply to Objection 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.3. because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God is one? Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5). Objection 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one. On the contrary, It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" (Dt. 6:4). I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (Question 4, Article 2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle. Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.4. unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God. Reply to Objection 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc. Reply to Objection 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether God is supremely one? Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one." Objection 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and a point is "one." Objection 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more than any other being is "one." On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place." I answer that, Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 7). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree. Reply to Objection 1: Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one." Reply to Objection 2: A point and unity which is the principle of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.11, C.5. number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident. Reply to Objection 3: Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars11-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.1. QUESTION 12 HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US Prologue As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image? (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye? (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God? (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another? (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God? (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it? (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes? (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God? (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.1. (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life? (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on Jn. 1:18, "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him." Objection 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (Question 7, Article 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. Objection 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect. Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God. On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 2:2). I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.2. suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God. Reply to Objection 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son." Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above (Question 7, Article 1). Reply to Objection 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is not comprehended. Reply to Objection 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image? Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 3:2). Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us." Objection 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma," "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude. I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing. Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.3. some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false. Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is. Reply to Objection 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory. Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth. Reply to Objection 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.3. the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye? Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee." Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God. Objection 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne," etc. (Is. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision." I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later (Question 78). Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 1). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect. Reply to Objection 1: The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.4. spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" (Eph. 1:17,18). Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation. Reply to Objection 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence? Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the Divine essence. Objection 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he understand God. Objection 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (Article 1). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence. On the contrary, It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" (Rm. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature. I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.5. above the nature of the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it. Reply to Objection 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above (Article 2). Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power. Reply to Objection 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in God. Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.5. the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light. Objection 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence. Objection 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God. On the contrary, It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps. 35:10). I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.6. God. By this light the blessed are made "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 2:2). Reply to Objection 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color. Reply to Objection 2: This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God. Reply to Objection 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this article. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another? Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was shown above (Article 3). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another. Objection 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude. On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41). I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.7. than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article. Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified. Reply to Objection 1: In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence. Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another. Reply to Objection 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him? Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run that you may comprehend." Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. Objection 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him. On the contrary, It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended. I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii). In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-8.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.8. scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above (Question 7) is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God. Reply to Objection 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" is taken more largely as opposed to "non�attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him go" (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire. Reply to Objection 2: God is called incomprehensible not because file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-8.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.8. anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained. Reply to Objection 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-8.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God? Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things. Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things. Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do. Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all things. On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things. I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-9.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.9. intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above (Article 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God. Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him. Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself. Reply to Objection 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly. Reply to Objection 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-9.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.9. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-9.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.10. ARTICLE 9. Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude? Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes. Objection 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it. On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or ideas. I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-10.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.10. things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen. Reply to Objection 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist. Reply to Objection 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-10.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.11. ARTICLE 10. Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time? Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively; for time means succession. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one glance." I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not successively. Reply to Objection 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-11.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.11. Reply to Objection 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at the same time. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-11.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.12. ARTICLE 11. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God? Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gn. 32:30). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12). Objection 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life. Objection 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see God Himself. Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence. On the contrary, It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex. 32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature." I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-12.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.12. because, as was said above (Article 4), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (Articles 2,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence. Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (SS, Question 174) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state. Reply to Objection 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (SS, Question 175). Reply to Objection 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-12.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.12. seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God. Reply to Objection 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-12.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.13. ARTICLE 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason? Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. Objection 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge. Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason. On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 1:19), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them." I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him. Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-13.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.13. Reply to Objection 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is." Reply to Objection 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects. Reply to Objection 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-13.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.14. ARTICLE 13. Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason? Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason. Objection 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason. Objection 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace. On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds. I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions. Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-14.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.12, C.14. as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mt. 3:17). Reply to Objection 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One. Reply to Objection 2: From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light. Reply to Objection 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars12-14.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.1. QUESTION 13 THE NAMES OF GOD Prologue After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it. Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry: (1) Whether God can be named by us? (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially? (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically? (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous? (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally? (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures? (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time? (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation? (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name? (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.1. (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God? (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether a name can be given to God? Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4). Objection 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God. Objection 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us. On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name." I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (Question 12, Articles 11,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition. Reply to Objection 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.2. Reply to Objection 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is. Reply to Objection 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether any name can be applied to God substantially? Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation." Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially. Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance. I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself. But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.3. same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names. Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies. Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (Question 4, Article 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (Question 4, Article 3), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.3. way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we are." Reply to Objection 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly. Reply to Objection 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre�exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified. Reply to Objection 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense? Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above (Article 1). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. Objection 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense. Objection 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense. I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.4. Reply to Objection 1: There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God. Reply to Objection 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life. Reply to Objection 3: These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether names applied to God are synonymous? Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous. Objection 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions. Objection 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous. On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name" (Jer. 32:18). I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above (Article 2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (Articles 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre�exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.5. received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous. Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above. Reply to Objection 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner. Reply to Objection 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them? Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated univocally. Objection 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (Gn. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally. Objection 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures. On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally. Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-6.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.6. I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion. Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-6.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.6. God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (Article 1). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health. Reply to Objection 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being. Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Question 4, Article 3). Reply to Objection 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus. The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-6.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.6. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-6.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures? Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God. Objection 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God. On the contrary, It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" (Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures. I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.7. called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (Article 2), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (Article 3). Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name. Reply to Objection 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above. Reply to Objection 3: This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally? Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally. Objection 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally. Objection 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity. Objection 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally. Objection 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false. Objection 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-8.htm (1 of 5)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.8. nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally. I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity. To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like. Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like. Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-8.htm (2 of 5)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.8. order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal. Reply to Objection 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly. Reply to Objection 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-8.htm (3 of 5)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.8. in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become our refuge" (Ps. 89:1). Reply to Objection 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like. Reply to Objection 4: Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it. Reply to Objection 5: Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him. Reply to Objection 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-8.htm (4 of 5)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.8. Himself. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-8.htm (5 of 5)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature? Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God Theos is so called from the theein and to cherish all things; or from the aithein, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from theasthai, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature. Objection 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not signify the divine nature. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature. I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same. Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in Article 1; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature. Reply to Objection 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-9.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.9. Reply to Objection 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (Question 12, Article 12). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-9.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.10. ARTICLE 9. Whether this name "God" is communicable? Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great and precious promises, that by these we may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pt. 1:4). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others. Objection 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is communicable. Objection 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable. On the contrary, It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable. I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-10.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.10. from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures. Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above (Article 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (Question 11, Article 3), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6). But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing. Reply to Objection 1: The divine nature is only communicable file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-10.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.10. according to the participation of some similitude. Reply to Objection 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name "sun." Reply to Objection 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-10.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.11. ARTICLE 10. Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion? Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally. Objection 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion. Objection 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both. On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally. Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion. I answer that, This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-11.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.11. apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health. The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically. Reply to Objection 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5). The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations. Reply to Objection 4: The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-11.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.11. said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments. Reply to Objection 5: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Question 12, Article 12). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-11.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.12. ARTICLE 11. Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God? Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS. Objection 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God. On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (Ex. 3:13,14). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God. I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons: First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (Question 3, Article 4), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-12.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.12. universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of substance." Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v). Reply to Objection 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular. Reply to Objection 2: This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause. Reply to Objection 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-12.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.13. ARTICLE 12. Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God? Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague." Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Question 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God. Objection 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above (Question 3, Article 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made. On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-13.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.13. the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself. God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition. Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification. Reply to Objection 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it. Reply to Objection 3: This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-13.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.13, C.13. it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars13-13.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.1. QUESTION 14 OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE Prologue Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas. Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry: (1) Whether there is knowledge in God? (2) Whether God understands Himself? (3) Whether He comprehends Himself? (4) Whether His understanding is His substance? (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself? (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them? (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.1. (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil? (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things? (12) Whether He knows the infinite? (13) Whether He knows future contingent things? (14) Whether He knows enunciable things? (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable? (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there is knowledge? Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God. Objection 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God. Objection 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (Question 3, Article 5). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. On the contrary, The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Rm. 11:33). I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Question 7, Article 1) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Question 7, Article 1), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.2. Reply to Objection 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (Question 4, Article 2), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act. Reply to Objection 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (Question 13, Article 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (Article 7). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13). Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God understands Himself? Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence. Objection 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself. Objection 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things. On the contrary, It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11). I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.3. Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself. Reply to Objection 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself. Reply to Objection 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object. Reply to Objection 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.3. intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God comprehends Himself? Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself. Objection 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above (Question 7, Article 1). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself. I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above (Articles 1,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. Reply to Objection 1: The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.4. speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer." Reply to Objection 2: When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance? Objection 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance. Objection 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great. Objection 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (Question 3, Article 4). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance. I answer that, It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above (Article 2), to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.5. above (Question 3). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance. Reply to Objection 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him. Reply to Objection 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent. Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether God knows things other than Himself? Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself. Objection 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible. Objection 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself. On the contrary, It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13). I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (Question 2, Article 3), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre�exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.6. Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. Reply to Objection 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained. Reply to Objection 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence. Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.6. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge? Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (Article 5), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge. Objection 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Question 12/Article 2). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge of it. Objection 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them. On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13). I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-7.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.7. being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings. But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (Question 4, Article 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors. Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (Question 4, Article 2) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-7.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.7. other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge. As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other. Reply to Objection 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge. We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-7.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.7. own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him. Reply to Objection 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse. Reply to Objection 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-7.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (Articles 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another. Objection 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive. Objection 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once." I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-8.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.8. secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive. Reply to Objection 1: Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as shown above. Reply to Objection 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above. Reply to Objection 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not discursive. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-8.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rm. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists." Objection 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal. Objection 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are." I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-9.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.9. knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the "knowledge of approbation." Reply to Objection 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above. But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them. Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. Reply to Objection 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-9.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.10. ARTICLE 9. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not? Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not. Objection 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God. Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not. On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (Rm. 4:17). I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-10.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.10. were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer. Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God. Reply to Objection 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act. Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-10.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.11. ARTICLE 10. Whether God knows evil things? Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (Article 2), it seems that God does not know evil things. Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things. Objection 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (Article 5). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. Objection 4: Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things. On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 15:11), "Hell and destruction are before God." I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-11.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.11. darkness except through light." Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good. Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known. Reply to Objection 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils. Reply to Objection 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-11.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.12. ARTICLE 11. Whether God knows singular things? Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things. Objection 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things. Objection 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things. On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes." I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (Question 4, Article 2). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect. Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-12.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.12. movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in their singularity. On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above (Article 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Question 44, Article 2), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form. Reply to Objection 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-12.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.12. Reply to Objection 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things. Reply to Objection 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-12.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.13. ARTICLE 12. Whether God can know infinite things? Objection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God. Objection 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge, which is infinite. Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds." I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (Article 9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever. The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-13.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.13. every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other. Reply to Objection 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above (Article 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. Reply to Objection 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable. Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-13.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.13. the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-13.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.14. ARTICLE 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (Article 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. Objection 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things. Objection 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things. I answer that, Since as was shown above (Article 9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-14.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.14. neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes. Reply to Objection 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. Reply to Objection 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-14.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.14. not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass will grow." Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i. Reply to Objection 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-14.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.14. saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary." Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-14.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.15. ARTICLE 14. Whether God knows enunciable things? Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. Objection 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. On the contrary, It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things. I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above (Article 9), it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them. Reply to Objection 1: This objection would avail if God knew file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-15.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.15. enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things. Reply to Objection 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-15.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.16. ARTICLE 15. Whether the knowledge of God is variable? Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures. Objection 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution. Objection 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable. On the contrary, It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" (James 1:17). I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing (Article 4), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (Question 9, Article 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. Reply to Objection 1: "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner. Reply to Objection 2: God knows also what He can make, and does file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-16.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.16. not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew. Reply to Objection 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-16.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.16. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-16.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.17. ARTICLE 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things? Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above (Article 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. Objection 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things. I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-17.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.14, C.17. In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly. Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art. Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made. Reply to Objection 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human. In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars14-17.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.1. QUESTION 15 OF IDEAS Prologue After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are ideas? (2) Whether they are many, or one only? (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there are ideas? Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas. Objection 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (Question 14, Article 5). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things. Objection 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas. On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood." I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word Idea is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason: In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.2. mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Question 46, Article 1), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists. Reply to Objection 1: God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect. Reply to Objection 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself. Reply to Objection 3: God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether ideas are many? Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea. Objection 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas. Objection 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal. Objection 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many. On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so." I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.3. of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas. Reply to Objection 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence. Reply to Objection 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.3. by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him. Reply to Objection 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things. Reply to Objection 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows? Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows. Objection 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above (Article 9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him. Objection 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion. Objection 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him. On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him. I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.15, C.4. Reply to Objection 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type." Reply to Objection 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type." Reply to Objection 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known. Reply to Objection 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Question 22, Article 3). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars15-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.1. QUESTION 16 OF TRUTH Prologue Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect? (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? (3) On the comparison of the true to being. (4) On the comparison of the true to the good. (5) Whether God is truth? (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many? (7) On the eternity of truth. (8) On the unchangeableness of truth. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect? Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect. Objection 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time. Objection 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect." I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.2. understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend. Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect. Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition. Reply to Objection 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.2. produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect. Reply to Objection 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. Objection 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things." I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.3. complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." And thus the Objections given are solved. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms? Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated (Article 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not�being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible. Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth. I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect. Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (Article 1). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (Article 1). It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.4. Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether good is logically prior to the true? Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true. Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above (Article 2). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true. On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good. I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good. Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.5. of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely. Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things. Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things (Article 1). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether God is truth? Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth. Objection 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth. Objection 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false. On the contrary, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (Jn. 14:6). I answer that, As said above (Article 1), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth. Reply to Objection 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect. Reply to Objection 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.6. unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect. Reply to Objection 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"--- is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true? Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God. Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true. On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men." I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said (Article 1) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.7. speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true. Reply to Objection 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God. Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether created truth is eternal? Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal. Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal. Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal. Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal. On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before (Question 10, Article 3). I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already (Article 5). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-8.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.8. Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God. Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal. Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause. Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-8.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether truth is immutable? Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is." Objection 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable. Objection 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes. Objection 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men." I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before (Article 1); but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-9.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.9. either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said before (Question 14, Article 15). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable. Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth. Reply to Objection 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before. Reply to Objection 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed. Reply to Objection 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-9.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.16, C.9. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars16-9.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.1. QUESTION 17 CONCERNING FALSITY Prologue We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether falsity exists in things? (2) Whether it exists in the sense? (3) Whether it exists in the intellect? (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether falsity exists in things? Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary." Objection 2: Further, false is derived from "fallere". But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things. Objection 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above (Question 16). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists. I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art. In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.2. perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" (Jn. 3:21). But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34. Reply to Objection 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness. Reply to Objection 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.2. bear to things which they actually are not. Reply to Objection 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively. To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether there is falsity in the senses? Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination. Objection 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity. On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes." I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (Question 16, Article 2), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are. The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man. Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.3. impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things. Reply to Objection 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation. Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance. Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether falsity is in the intellect? Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect. On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,22 that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect. I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said (Article 2) that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (Question 16, Article 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above (Article 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.4. But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all. Reply to Objection 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect. Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether true and false are contraries? Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things. Objection 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries. Objection 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one. I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not�being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries. Reply to Objection 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.17, C.5. apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good." Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth. Reply to Objection 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars17-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.1. QUESTION 18 THE LIFE OF GOD Prologue Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise: (1) To whom does it belong to live? (2) What is life? (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God? (4) Whether all things in God are life? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether to live belongs to all natural things? Objection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life. Objection 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live. Objection 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life. I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. I [De Plantis I, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.2. operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude. Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies. Reply to Objection 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies. Reply to Objection 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether life is an operation? Objection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation. Objection 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation. Objection 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of Jn. 18:3, "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be." I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Question 17, Article 3), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (Question 13, Article 1), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self�movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" denotes "to run" in the abstract. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.3. Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand. Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding. Reply to Objection 2: By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal. Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God? Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated (Article 2). But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. Objection 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him. Objection 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay. Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.4. through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self�movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship. But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act. Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.4. perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect. Reply to Objection 2: As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life. Reply to Objection 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether all things are life in God? Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him. Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God. Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially. Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible. On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God. I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated (Article 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself. Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.5. words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life. Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind. Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential. Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.18, C.5. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars18-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.1. QUESTION 19 THE WILL OF GOD Prologue After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is will in God? (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself? (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily? (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things? (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will? (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled? (7) Whether the will of God is mutable? (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed? (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil? (10) Whether God has free will? (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God? (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.1. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there is will in God? Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God. Objection 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God. Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 12:2): "That you may prove what is the will of God." I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His will. Reply to Objection 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Question 6, Article 3): for the end has the aspect of good. Reply to Objection 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.2. what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence. Reply to Objection 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God wills things apart from Himself? Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself. Objection 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible. Objection 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself. Objection 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of God, your sanctification." I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above (Article 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.3. that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein. Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (Question 13, Article 4). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself. Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness. Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things. Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily? Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily. Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (Question 2, Article 3). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable. Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself. Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.4. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills. I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change. Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition. Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things. Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.4. other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary. Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non�necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good. Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the will of God is the cause of things? Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things. Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things. Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will. Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (Question 14, Article 8). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things. On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?" I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature. This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.5. that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and will. This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (Question 7, Article 2). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect. Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre�exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things. Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction. Reply to Objection 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will. Reply to Objection 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (Article 2, ad 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.5. Reply to Objection 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these things are one. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will? Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause. Objection 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown (Article 4). If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will. Objection 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible. On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it. I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.6. same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding. Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that. Reply to Objection 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another. Reply to Objection 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God." Reply to Objection 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.6. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled? Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled. Objection 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled. Objection 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would." I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-7.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.7. heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished. Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed. To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-7.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.7. qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place. Reply to Objection 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists. Reply to Objection 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-7.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether the will of God is changeable? Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (Gn. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will. Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer. 18:7,8) Therefore God has a changeable will. Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will. Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before (Article 3). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will. On the contrary, It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19). I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-8.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.8. he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (Question 9, Article 1; Question 14, Article 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had made. Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened. Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-8.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.8. Reply to Objection 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (Article 3). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-8.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed? Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be." Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rm. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely. On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things. I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent. This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-9.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.9. the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently. Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true. Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will. Reply to Objection 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-9.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.10. ARTICLE 9. Whether God wills evils? Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things. Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil. Objection 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist. On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things. I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (Question 5, Article 1), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-10.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.10. killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted. Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially. Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity. Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-10.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.10. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-10.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.11. ARTICLE 10. Whether God has free-will? Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [Ep. 146, ad Damas]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free�will, can be inclined to either side." Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said (Article 9). Therefore there is not free-will in God. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity." I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (Article 3), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will. Reply to Objection 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin. Reply to Objection 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-11.htm2006-06-02 23:24:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.12. ARTICLE 11. Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God? Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will. Objection 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will. On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps. 110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will. I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Question 13, Article 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Mt. 6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-12.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.12. metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will. Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will. Reply to Objection 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-12.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.13. ARTICLE 12. Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will? Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct. Objection 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression. Objection 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order. Objection 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil--- namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good. I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-13.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.13. same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of Mt. 6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it." Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation. Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission. Reply to Objection 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another. Reply to Objection 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these. Reply to Objection 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-13.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.19, C.13. attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr...mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars19-13.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.1. QUESTION 20 GOD'S LOVE Prologue We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether love exists in God? (2) Whether He loves all things? (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another? (4) Whether He loves more the better things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether love exists in God? Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God. Objection 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God. On the contrary, It is written: "God is love" (Jn. 4:16). I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.2. must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Question 19, Article 1), and hence we must attribute love to Him. Reply to Objection 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion. Reply to Objection 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (Question 3, Article 2, ad 2; Question 19, Article 11). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (Question 19, Article 11). Reply to Objection 3: An act of love always tends towards two file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.2. things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (Question 6, Articles 1,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God loves all things? Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself. Objection 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself. Objection 3: Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things. Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things. On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (Question 19, Article 4) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.3. goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness. Reply to Objection 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things." Reply to Objection 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves. Reply to Objection 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves. Reply to Objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.3. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God loves all things equally? Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally. Objection 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others. Objection 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others. On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself." I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said (Article 2), no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness. Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.4. good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree. Reply to Objection 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether God always loves more the better things? Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (Rm. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Lk. 15:7). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. Objection 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things. On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-5.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.5. is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God. I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown (Articles 2,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things. Reply to Objection 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according to Is. 9:6. Reply to Objection 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health. Reply to Objection 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-5.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.5. Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2). Reply to Objection 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed." Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king. Reply to Objection 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-5.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.20, C.5. worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars20-5.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.1. QUESTION 21 THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD Prologue After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is justice in God? (2) Whether His justice can be called truth? (3) Whether there is mercy in God? (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there is justice in God? Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice. Objection 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him. Objection 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God. Objection 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice." I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rm. 11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it." Reply to Objection 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.2. and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Question 20, Article 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues. Reply to Objection 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself. Reply to Objection 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.2. other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness." Reply to Objection 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the justice of God is truth? Objection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice. On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice. I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (Question 16, Article 1). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art. Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice. Reply to Objection 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will. Reply to Objection 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.3. cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether mercy can be attributed to God? Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him. Objection 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God. On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord." I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Question 6, Article 4). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (Question 6, Articles 1,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said (Article 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy. Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:59 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.4. Reply to Objection 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement" (James 2:13). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:24:59 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice? Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear. Objection 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rm. 15). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy. Objection 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy. Objection 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth." I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:59 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.5. them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion. Reply to Objection 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved. In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (Lk. 7:47). Reply to Objection 2: God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers. Reply to Objection 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God." Reply to Objection 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:59 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.21, C.5. God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars21-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:24:59 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.1. QUESTION 22 THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD Prologue Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God? (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence? (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things? (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-1.htm2006-06-02 23:24:59 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God? Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God. Objection 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God. Objection 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God. On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence." I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (Question 6, Article 4). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (Question 21, Article 4). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (Question 19, Article 4), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.2. regard to oneself---as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Mt. 24:45), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [FS, Question 57, Article 6]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11). Reply to Objection 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence--- namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal. Reply to Objection 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.2. (Question 19). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether everything is subject to the providence of God? Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. Objection 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. Objection 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence. Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God doth not care for oxen": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-3.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.3. individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job 22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered" (Rm. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (Question 14, Articles 6,11) that God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art. Reply to Objection 1: There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-3.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.3. cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. Reply to Objection 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence. Reply to Objection 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients. Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-3.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.3. the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, all things work together unto good" (Rm. 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. Reply to Objection 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Question 19, Article 10), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-3.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God has immediate providence over everything? Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. Objection 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn. Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things. On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made." I answer that, Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.4. exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14). Reply to Objection 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned. Reply to Objection 2: God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (Question 19, Articles 5,8). Reply to Objection 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:00 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen? Objection 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen. Objection 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided. Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency. I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. Reply to Objection 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:01 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.22, C.5. by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency. Reply to Objection 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency. Reply to Objection 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars22-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:01 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.1. QUESTION 23 OF PREDESTINATION Prologue After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God? (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined? (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men? (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen? (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election? (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved? (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain? (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:01 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether men are predestined by God? Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away. Objection 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (Question 22, Articles 1,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. Objection 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [Question 22, Article 3]. Therefore men are not predestined. Objection 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false. On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called." I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Question 22, Article 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (Question 22, Articles 1,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:01 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.2. nature of every creature, as shown above (Question 12, Article 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence. Reply to Objection 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him. Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end. Reply to Objection 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (Question 21, Articles 3,4). Reply to Objection 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:01 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:01 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether predestination places anything in the predestined? Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined. Objection 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. (Rm. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined. Objection 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined. Objection 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined. I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Question 22, Article 1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:02 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.3. of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified." Reply to Objection 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (Question 14, Article 2; Question 18, Article 3, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them. Reply to Objection 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted. Reply to Objection 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation. Reply to Objection 4: Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:02 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.3. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:02 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God reprobates any man? Objection 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man. Objection 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (Osee 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate any man. Objection 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone. On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Question 22, Article 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:02 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.4. Reply to Objection 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them. Reply to Objection 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." Reply to Objection 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Question 19, Article 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free�will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:02 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the predestined are chosen by God? Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. IV, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination. Objection 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election. Objection 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election. On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world." I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (Article 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Question 22, Article 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (Question 20, Articles 2,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (Article 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:02 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.5. some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love. Reply to Objection 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Question 6, Article 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied. Reply to Objection 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Question 20, Article 2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice." Reply to Objection 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:02 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination? Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rm. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rm. 9:15: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. Objection 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination. Objection 3: Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Rm. 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above (Article 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (Question 19, Article 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-6.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.6. whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Rm. 9:11,12): "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger." Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination. And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-6.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.6. secondary causes, as was above shown (Question 22, Article 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre�ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. Reply to Objection 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above. Reply to Objection 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated. Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-6.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.6. should never happen, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rm. 9:22,23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim. 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Mt. 20:14,15). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-6.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether predestination is certain? Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain. Objection 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain. Objection 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain. On the contrary, A gloss on Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed." I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (Article 1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (Question 22, Article 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (Question 14, Article 13; Question 19, Article 4) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible. Reply to Objection 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.7. two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others. Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect. Reply to Objection 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above (Article 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether the number of the predestined is certain? Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (Dt. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain. Objection 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre�ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain. Objection 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mt. 7:13,14: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished." I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (Article 6). Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-8.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.8. His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite (Question 7, Articles 2,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that universe--- that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not pre�ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination. It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rm. 8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-8.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.8. [From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']" Reply to Objection 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined. Reply to Objection 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe. Reply to Objection 3: The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-8.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:03 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints? Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints. Objection 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? Or who hath been His counsellor?" (Rm. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. Objection 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything. On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" (Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints. I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works. Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-9.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.9. authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kgs. 15:29); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance" (Rm. 11:29). Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pt. 1:10). Reply to Objection 1: This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination. Reply to Objection 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality. Reply to Objection 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-9.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.23, C.9. the first universal cause, as has been said above (Question 19, Article 6), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars23-9.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.24, C.1. QUESTION 24 THE BOOK OF LIFE Prologue We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the book of life? (2) Of what life is it the book? (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars24-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.24, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the book of life is the same as predestination? Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" (Ecclus. 4:32)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not predestination. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. Objection 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life. On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew." I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (Question 23, Article 4) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars24-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.24, C.2. foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His." Reply to Objection 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers. Hence the solution of the Second Objection. Reply to Objection 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination. Reply to Objection 4: Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars24-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.24, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined? Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined. Objection 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called. Objection 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (Jn. 6:71). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace. On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above (Article 1). But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. I answer that, The book of life, as stated above (Article 1), implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above (Question 23, Article 1). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. Reply to Objection 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars24-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.24, C.3. From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature. Reply to Objection 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars24-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:04 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.24, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life? Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life. Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly. Objection 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out. On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" (Ps. 68:29). I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars24-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:05 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.24, C.4. very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace. Reply to Objection 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change. Reply to Objection 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers. Reply to Objection 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars24-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:05 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.1. QUESTION 25 THE POWER OF GOD Prologue After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is power in God? (2) Whether His power is infinite? (3) Whether He is almighty? (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been? (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does? (6) Whether what He makes He could make better? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:05 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there is power in God? Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 3). Therefore, there is no power in God. Objection 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God. Objection 4: Further, it was shown above (Question 14, Article 8; Question 19, Article 4) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will. On the contrary, It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9). I answer that, Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (Question 3, Article 2; Question 4, Articles 1, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:05 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.2. therefore, that in God there is active power in the highest degree. Reply to Objection 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power. Reply to Objection 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than His power. Reply to Objection 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect. Reply to Objection 4: Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:05 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the power of God is infinite? Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite. Objection 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible. Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence (Question 7, Article 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (Question 7, Article 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (Question 7, Article 1); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.3. Reply to Objection 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (Question 3, Article 5; Question 4, Article 3). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it. Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God is omnipotent? Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (Question 2, Article 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent. Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent. Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent. Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent. On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (Lk. 1:37). I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-4.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.4. that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do. It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey. It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non�being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-4.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.4. divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above (Article 1). Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury. Reply to Objection 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Question 21, Article 4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things. Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-4.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.4. reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (Question 14, Article 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-4.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether God can make the past not to have been? Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been. Objection 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run. Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt. On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been. I answer that, As was said above (Question 7, Article 2), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.5. thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make undone the things that have been done." Reply to Objection 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power. Reply to Objection 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done. Reply to Objection 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:06 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether God can do what He does not? Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. Objection 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. Objection 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does. On the contrary, It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" (Mt. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not. I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (Question 19, Article 3) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:07 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.6. wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (Question 21, Article 2), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done. Reply to Objection 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (Question 19, Article 3), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above (Article 3). What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre�ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:07 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.6. Reply to Objection 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just." Reply to Objection 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:07 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether God can do better than what He does? Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does. Objection 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does. Objection 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God. Objection 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them. On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand." I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-7.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:07 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.7. essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him. Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance. Reply to Objection 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails. Reply to Objection 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe. Reply to Objection 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-7.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:07 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.25, C.7. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars25-7.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:07 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.1. QUESTION 26 OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE Prologue After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God? (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect? (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed? (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:07 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether beatitude belongs to God? Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God. Objection 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude. On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." (1 Tim. 6:15). I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree. Reply to Objection 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (Question 4, Article 2; Question 13, Article 4), in simplicity and unity. Reply to Objection 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect? Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect. Objection 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect. I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above (Article 1), is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude. Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect. Reply to Objection 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.3. the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed? Objection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (Question 6, Articles 2,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (Question 11, Article 3). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself. Objection 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone. On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God. I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing. Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate. Reply to Objection 2: End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.4. as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God? Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. Objection 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (Question 4, Article 2). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures. Reply to Objection 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude. Reply to Objection 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner. We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.26, C.5. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars26-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:08 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.1. QUESTION 27 THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS Prologue Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons. Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is procession in God? (2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation? (3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation. (4) Whether that other procession can be called generation? (5) Whether there are more than two processions in God? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:09 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there is procession in God? Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God. Objection 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession. Objection 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown above (Question 2, Article 3). Therefore in God there is no procession. On the contrary, Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (Jn. 8:42). I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God" (1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Cor. 6:19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The Son cannot of Himself do anything" (Jn. 5:19); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:09 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.2. and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice. As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God. Reply to Objection 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained. Reply to Objection 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God (Question 14, Article 2), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity. Reply to Objection 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:09 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.2. something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to things designed. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:09 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether any procession in God can be called generation? Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God. Objection 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained (Article 1). But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God. Objection 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-subsisting (Question 3, Article 4), it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation in God. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten Thee." I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:09 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.3. there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation:---from a conjoined principle (as above described):---by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:---and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above (Question 14, Article 4). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son. Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act; in which sense it is not found in God. Reply to Objection 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands (Question 14, Article 4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was brought forth." (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature. Reply to Objection 3: Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not, however, as if He were file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:09 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.3. other from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (Question 4, Article 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:09 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word? Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God. Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self�communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature (Question 11, Article 4), it follows that only one procession exists in God. Objection 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect (Question 19, Article 1). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word. On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jn. 15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (Jn. 14:16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word. I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the Word, and another. In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the object spoken of or understood is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.4. in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another procession called the procession of love. Reply to Objection 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will. Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God (Question 3, Articles 3,4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not apply to other natures. Reply to Objection 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the procession of love in God is generation? Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated and born. Objection 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its like" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation. Objection 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is generation. On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding." I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object. So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.5. begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action. Reply to Objection 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the divine nature, but is not said to be born. Reply to Objection 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of love. Reply to Objection 3: We can name God only from creatures (Question 13, Article 1). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether there are more than two processions in God? Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power. Objection 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God. Objection 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions. On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed--- the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions. I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love. Reply to Objection 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures. Reply to Objection 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.27, C.6. Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness. Reply to Objection 3: As above explained (Question 14, Article 5; Question 19, Article 5), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars27-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.1. QUESTION 28 THE DIVINE RELATIONS Prologue The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are real relations in God? (2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it? (3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other? (4) The number of these relations. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:10 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there are real relations in God? Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God. Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind. Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God. Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations. On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy. I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.2. necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Question 27, Articles 2,4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations. Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another. Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity. Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above explained (Question 14, Articles 3,4; Question 19, Article 8). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.2. very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists. Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether relation in God is the same as His essence? Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine essence. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation. Objection 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting (Question 3, Article 4). Therefore relation is not the divine essence. On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty." I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed. To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.3. the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only. Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term. Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same. Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity. Reply to Objection 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.3. meaning of relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained (Question 13, Article 2), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us. Reply to Objection 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus (Question 4, Article 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other? Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other. Objection 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation. Objection 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius. I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation (Article 1), there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute---namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative. Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.4. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other. Reply to Objection 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument. Reply to Objection 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:11 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether in God there are only four real relations--- paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession? Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God. Objection 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite series of real relations. Objection 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal (Question 15, Article 1); and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations. Objection 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations are eternal in God than the above named. Objection 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way of reasoning there is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not four relations in God. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him (Question 13, Article 7). Hence, it follows that real file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.5. relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two only, as above explained (Question 27, Article 5), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own (Question 27, Article 4); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations. Reply to Objection 1: In those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation; because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the word. Reply to Objection 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by another act understands that he understands the stone, and again by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He understands all things by one act alone. Reply to Objection 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.28, C.5. relations in God; but that God knows these many relations. Reply to Objection 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations; but are only logical relations (Question 42, Article 3, ad 4). Reply to Objection 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of something absolute, if there were such between them. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars28-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.1. QUESTION 29 THE DIVINE PERSONS Prologue Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the persons. First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in common; and then singly. The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points: (1) The signification of this word "person"; (2) the number of the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons. Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The definition of "person." (2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis. (3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God? (4) What does it signify in Him? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.2. ARTICLE 1. The definition of "person". Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular. Therefore person is improperly defined. Objection 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word "individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second substances are the "genera" or "species." Therefore this definition is incorrect. Objection 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal" would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition. Objection 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence." Objection 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not properly defined as above. I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.2. individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances. Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is "person." Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances. Reply to Objection 1: Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines person. Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part. But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater---that is, by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when "individual" is added, it is restricted to first substance. Reply to Objection 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.2. placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances. Reply to Objection 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines "nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of "person," which means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from being, which is most common. Reply to Objection 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:12 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence? Objection 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis," "subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that "the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies "person." Therefore "person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis." Objection 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person" and "subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and "subsistence" mean the same. Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek ousia, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called "hypostasis" and "person." Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning. Objection 4: On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the same as subsistences. Objection 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called ousiosis---that is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs from the others. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia, what we may call "essence." In another sense substance means a subject or "suppositum," which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called "suppositum." It is also called by file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.3. three names signifying a reality---that is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called "subsistence"; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance." What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name "person" signifies in the genus of rational substances. Reply to Objection 1: Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature. Reply to Objection 2: As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and "three subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because the word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to "hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use "subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance." Reply to Objection 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity (Question 3, Article 3). Reply to Objection 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.3. the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species. Reply to Objection 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and ousiosis, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the word "person" should be said of God? Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore "person" is not to be applied to God. Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called prosopa, as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes." This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically. Objection 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word "hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person" should not be said of God. Objection 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above (Question 14, Article 12); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature." And also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word "person" ought not to be attributed to God. On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.4. I answer that, "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all nature--- that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when treating of the names of God (Question 13, Article 2). Reply to Objection 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self�subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20). Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a "person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to God. Reply to Objection 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word," forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word "substance," which corresponds to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.4. hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence. Reply to Objection 4: It may be said that God has a rational "nature," if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above (Article 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable existence of the divine nature." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether this word "person" signifies relation? Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son." Objection 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies essence. Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated. Therefore "person" signifies substance. Objection 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word "person" signifies relation. I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express relation. Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word "Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of the Father, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-5.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.5. another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth. To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of "man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person. Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above (Question 28, Articles 2,3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly, and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-5.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.5. the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word "person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification. Reply to Objection 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a substance---which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the same. Reply to Objection 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the "suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons. Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual---i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above explained. Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures (Question 13, Article 5). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-5.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.29, C.5. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars29-5.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:13 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.1. QUESTION 30 THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD Prologue We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are several persons in God? (2) How many are they? (3) What the numeral terms signify in God? (4) The community of the term "person." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there are several persons in God? Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God. For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If then there are several persons in God, there must be several substances; which appears to be heretical. Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of relations (Question 28, Article 3). Therefore there cannot be several persons in God. Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number. Therefore there are not several persons in God. Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity. On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons. I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several persons in God. For it was shown above (Question 29, Article 4) that this word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine nature. It was also established (Question 28, Article 1) that there are several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that there are several persons in God. Reply to Objection 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance," not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by the addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So, as we say, "Three persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however, accustomed to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.2. Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist, nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is, several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other (Question 28, Article 3). Hence the plurality of persons in God. Reply to Objection 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations. Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated, as Boethius teaches in the same book. Reply to Objection 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered, in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity, as we shall show further on (Question 42, Articles 1, 4). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether there are more than three persons in God? Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated above (Article 1). But there are four relations in God as stated above (Question 28, Article 4), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God. Objection 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three persons in God. Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are an infinite number of persons in God. Objection 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and so to infinity. Objection 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured, for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense." Therefore the persons are not contained within the number three. On the contrary, It is said: "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 Jn. 5:7). To those who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4), "Three persons." Therefore there are but three persons in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.3. I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only three persons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person generating and the person generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (Question 27, Articles 3,4). We must frequently admit that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Reply to Objection 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor is it a personal relation---i.e. constituting a person. The three relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are called personal properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding. Reply to Objection 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way of nature; thus, as above explained (Question 27, Article 3), the procession of the divine Word is the very same as generation by file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.3. way of nature. But love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and therefore the procession of love is not called generation in God. Reply to Objection 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real operation---that is, His essence. How there are in Him two processions was above explained (Question 27, Articles 1,4). Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from the other persons who are in God. Reply to Objection 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the same (Question 42, Articles 1,4), and the same is not measured by the same. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:14 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God? Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in God. Objection 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God. Objection 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the numeral terms denote something real in God. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God, unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God." Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove something; and not to denote anything positive. I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary. In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.4. Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God, asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity. But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being" is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the divine unity (Question 11, Article 1); for "one" signifies undivided being. So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance, "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself. But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units. Reply to Objection 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude; hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.4. explained above. Reply to Objection 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God: unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to God. Reply to Objection 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity, but division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Question 11, Article 2). It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons? Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly. Therefore it is not common to all three. Objection 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Question 29, Article 3, ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three persons. Objection 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really; otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved above (Question 3, Article 5). Therefore this term 'person' is not common to the three. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask, "Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is common to them. I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of the three, as also one essence. What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word "incommunicable." Others thought it to be a community of intention, as the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that to be a "species" is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.30, C.5. name of a reality. We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name "person" is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms "genus" or "species." The vague individual thing, as "some man," signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular things---that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference---that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify the individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name "person" is common in idea to the three divine persons. Reply to Objection 1: This argument is founded on a real community. Reply to Objection 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many. Reply to Objection 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species; and because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars30-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.1. QUESTION 31 OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD Prologue We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which gives rise to four points of inquiry: (1) Concerning the word "Trinity"; (2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father? (3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be joined to an essential name in God? (4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:15 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there is trinity in God? Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be applied to God. Objection 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word "trinity" does not apply to God. Objection 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither is there trinity in God. Objection 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy. Objection 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the word trinity is not to be applied to God. On the contrary, Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in Unity is to be revered." I answer that, The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner. Reply to Objection 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.2. rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another. Reply to Objection 2: Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For "people" is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words; but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is unity of essence. Reply to Objection 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion, according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not triplicity, but Trinity. Reply to Objection 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is in its "supposita." Reply to Objection 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself; since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three "supposita" of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is trine," it follows that there are three "supposita" of the Godhead. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the Son is other than the Father? Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father. For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If, then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity." Objection 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity." Objection 3: Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other that the Father. Objection 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father. On the contrary, Augustine [Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum I] says: "There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another." I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks [In substance, Ep. LVII], a heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between them---namely, the error of Arius, who placed a Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.3. essence. Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or "difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of "diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead": and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable." To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity," lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective "only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God." This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly say that "the Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis. Reply to Objection 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.3. the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another. Reply to Objection 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But "difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated. Reply to Objection 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that He is anything "alien." Reply to Objection 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the "suppositum"; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in God? Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another." But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that God is alone. Objection 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot be said to be alone. Objection 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God. On the contrary, It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17). I answer that, This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term "alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is above stated (Article 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other "suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.4. alone writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal. Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate. Reply to Objection 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the "suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that is, no one else---"runs: and Socrates runs only"--- that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the "suppositum." So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone. Reply to Objection 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.4. exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:16 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term? Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true God" (Jn. 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God. Objection 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (Mt. 11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion follows. Objection 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white," or that "man is not white." But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true. Objection 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ." On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes two assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings. I answer that, When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways. For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"---that is, "He who with no other is the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.31, C.5. because they are not the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said "He who alone is called the Father is God." But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work. Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word "only" excludes another thing, as above explained. The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term "no one" is not the same as "no man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature. Reply to Objection 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity. Reply to Objection 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God the Father." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars31-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.1. QUESTION 32 THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS Prologue We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason? (2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons? (3) The number of the notions? (4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason? Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rm. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as regards knowledge of a third person---i.e. of the Holy Ghost ---and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the generation of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural reason. Objection 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this (Question 27, Articles 1,3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason. Objection 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-2.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.2. the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession (Question 30, Article 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason. I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Question 12, Articles 4,12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating of God as above (Question 12, Article 12). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that "faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such grounds. Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of the word"---i.e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule." Reply to Objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-2.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.2. the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words, "We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the world"---i.e. the philosophers---"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless, they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number," etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In the beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" (Rm. 1); or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called "mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad," etc., this does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For one God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself. Reply to Objection 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-2.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.2. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely. Reply to Objection 3: There are two reason why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light," to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-2.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:17 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether there are notions in God? Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in God. Objection 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore there do not exist notions in God. Objection 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We recognize difference of hypostases, in the three properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional." Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God. I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and wherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your kindness"---i.e. you who are kind---so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean God the Father. But, as shown above (Question 3, Article 3, ad 1), the use of concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.3. mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names. But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity and Father. Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask: "Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?" as we answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the property as "Whereby." The second motive is because one person in God is related to two persons---namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations. For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence there is no parity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.3. Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the creature (Question 28, Article 1,3); while there is no reason against our admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there must be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions. Reply to Objection 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete. Reply to Objection 2: In God the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are real, as stated above (Question 28, Article 1). Therefore whatever has order to any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; forasmuch as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also on account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is the Father. Reply to Objection 3: Although the persons are simple, still without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be abstractedly signified, as above explained. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether there are five notions? Objection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four (Question 28, Article 4). Therefore the notions are only four in number. Objection 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary; which cannot be allowed. Objection 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be admitted. Therefore there are not five notions. Objection 4: On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion. Objection 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes a person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.4. that He is from no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called "innascibility." As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of "paternity"; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of "common spiration." The Son can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is known by "filiation"; and also by another person proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is known, by "common spiration." The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from others; thus He is known by "procession"; but not by the fact that another is from Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him. Therefore, there are Five notions in God: "innascibility," "paternity," "filiation," and "procession." Of these only four are relations, for "innascibility" is not a relation, except by reduction, as will appear later (Question 33, Article 4, ad 3). Four only are properties. For "common spiration" is not a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions---i.e. constituting persons, "paternity," "filiation," and "procession." "Common spiration" and "innascibility" are called notions of Persons, but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on (Question 40, Article 1, ad 1). Reply to Objection 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must be admitted, as above explained. Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons, nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions. Reply to Objection 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predicated of each other, because they are different ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is power. Reply to Objection 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above (Question 19, Article 3) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.4. from the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity, as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one. Reply to Objection 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which a notion is based must be something special; thus no parity of reasoning exists. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3): "No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the notions. Objection 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore neither can there be about the notions. On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible. I answer that, Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial of it involves as a consequence something against faith; as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown; whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as heretical which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now more manifest. So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow, he would lapse into heresy. By what has been said all the objections may be solved. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.32, C.5. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars32-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:18 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.1. QUESTION 33 OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER Prologue We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the Father is the Principle? (2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name "Father"? (3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said essentially? (4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle? Objection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the principle of the Son. Objection 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which appears false. Objection 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity." I answer that, The word "principle" signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle. Reply to Objection 1: The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle" indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because "principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more common than "element." For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (Question 13, Article 11), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word "principle." For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas we use the term "principle" even in things which file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.2. have no such difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a line. Reply to Objection 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father something of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is give." Reply to Objection 3: Although this word principle, as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above (Question 13, Article 8). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether this name "Father" is properly the name of a divine person? Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly the name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies relation. Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore this name "Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person. Objection 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is more properly applied to God, as stated above (Question 13, Article 11). Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Father. Objection 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not properly called Father. Objection 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father" taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 88:27): "He shall cry out to me: Thou art my Father." I answer that, The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other persons. Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father. Reply to Objection 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.3. So this name "father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God the relation signified by the name "Father" is a subsisting person. Hence, as above explained (Question 29, Article 4), this name "person" in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature. Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the name "Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or begettor. Reply to Objection 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father. Reply to Objection 4: The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named" (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.3. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether this name "Father" is applied to God, firstly as a personal name? Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name, belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the whole Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an essential name before its personal sense. Objection 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; since, according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally. Objection 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same concept as, paternity taken essentially. On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the creature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature. I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which only partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said by way of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.4. similitude. Now it is manifest from the foregoing (Question 27, Article 2; Question 28, Article 4), that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational creatures, according to Job 38:28: "Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according to Dt. 32:6: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee?" And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to Rm. 8:16,17: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also." Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to Rm. 5:2: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is applied to God first, as importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to creatures. Reply to Objection 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations; because the person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words of Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.4. Reply to Objection 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First Born among many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten (Jn. 1:18): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto us." From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:19 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Father. Objection 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be. Objection 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten. Objection 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another. Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten. Objection 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be unproceeding. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one ---that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten---namely, by the property in each one respectively of innascibility and origin." I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-5.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.5. or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son. Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one way as the first "principle," by reason of its having a relation to what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a "first" principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word "begotten." Reply to Objection 1: Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative term only, but either that it means both these things together---namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is included in the common. For source and authority signify in God nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports the negation of passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow that "unbegotten" is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what has no part. Reply to Objection 2: "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is unbegotten," that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may be taken in a kind of privation sense, but not as implying any imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-5.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.5. "unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the same nature is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name "unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another---namely, from the Father. Reply to Objection 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9), "unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality. Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father. Reply to Objection 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two innascibles." And this especially because, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature. Reply to Objection 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost; file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-5.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.33, C.5. both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as stated above (Question 27, Article 4, ad 3), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the person begotten. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars33-5.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.1. QUESTION 34 OF THE PERSON OF THE SON Prologue We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son---namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image. Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son? (3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:20 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether Word in God is a personal name? Objection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jn. 1:1), "In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a personal name in God. Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The Word is knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), "To speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God. Objection 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and not in a personal sense. Objection 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which do His Word" (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is." But the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word. I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential name. To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word---that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-2.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.2. sound signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii, text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the angel"---that is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, "this is the word I have said," or "which the king has commanded," alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command. Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever can understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word." The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself---namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin (Question 27, Articles 3,4,5). Hence the term "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally. Reply to Objection 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-2.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.2. remain within him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally. Reply to Objection 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called "begotten knowledge." Thus can also be explained how "to speak" is in God "to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought. Still the term "thought" does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): "Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation." Reply to Objection 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word is not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-2.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.2. not true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak" improperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ from each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was proved above (Question 14, Articles 4,5). Whereas to "speak" means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word. Reply to Objection 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-2.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name? Objection 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son. Objection 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi). Objection 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned. Objection 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son. Objection 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we understand the Son alone." I answer that, "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Question 27, Article 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God. Reply to Objection 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.3. the same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are activities if the soul." Reply to Objection 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi). Reply to Objection 3: In the term "Word" the same property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and Son express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one name. Reply to Objection 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God essentially, as stated above (Question 14, Articles 2,4). Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation. Reply to Objection 5: When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He manifests the Son. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.3. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the name "Word" imports relation to creatures? Objection 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures. Objection 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature. Objection 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the creature. Objection 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many. Objection 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false. On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power." I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures. And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.4. whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps. 32:9): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes. Reply to Objection 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures. Reply to Objection 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent---as to know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect. Reply to Objection 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures. Reply to Objection 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a personal one. Reply to Objection 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.34, C.4. Word about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars34-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.35, C.1. QUESTION 35 OF THE IMAGE Prologue We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether Image in God is said personally? (2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars35-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:21 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.35, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether image in God is said personally? Objection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God. For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one." Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally. Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): "An image is a like species of that which it represents." But species or form is said of God essentially. Therefore so also is Image. Objection 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies "before" and "after." But in the divine persons there is no "before" and "after." Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself?" Therefore the Image in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name. I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only similitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species of different animals are of different figures; but not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because, as Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived from it." Therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name "Image" is a personal name. Reply to Objection 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name of Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars35-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.35, C.2. Reply to Objection 2: "Species," as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form. Reply to Objection 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars35-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.35, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son? Objection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy Ghost is the Image of the Son." Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone. Objection 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an image, as Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not belong to the Son alone. Objection 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to 1 Cor. 11:7, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God." Therefore Image is not proper to the Son. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is the Image of the Father." I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words, "Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures" (Col. 1:15) and again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance." (Heb. 1:3). Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion. This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason thereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image. Hence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father, because again the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars35-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.35, C.3. Son, because then there would be one image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain further on (Question 36, Article 4). Hence there is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since even man is one image of the whole Trinity. Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be "born"; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds; whereas this does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to that love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love. Reply to Objection 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude. Reply to Objection 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above explained. Reply to Objection 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way it is found in something of a different nature, as the king's image on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man, man is not simply called the image, but "to the image," whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that the Son of God is "to the image," because He is the perfect Image of the Father. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars35-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.1. QUESTION 36 OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST Prologue We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine Person? (2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and the Son? (3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son? (4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:22 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether this name "Holy Ghost" is the proper name of one divine person? Objection 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of 'Holy Ghost' is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the "Spirit of God" sometimes means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: "In the Spirit of God I cast out devils" (Mt. 12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of Joel 2:28: "I will pour out of My Spirit over all flesh." Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a divine person. Objection 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not a relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine Person. Objection 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them" (Num. 11:17) and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (4 Kgs. 2:15). Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a divine Person. On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): "There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person. I answer that, While there are two processions in God, one of these, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above (Question 27, Article 4, ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name (Question 28, Article 4): for which reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But as some names are accommodated by the usual file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.2. mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact that the person who is called "Holy Ghost" has something in common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11), "Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both are called in common. For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy." Secondly, from the proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most properly named "The Holy Ghost." Reply to Objection 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the immateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word "holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above explained. Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus]. Reply to Objection 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power. But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.2. "our Father," and "our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son? Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But in the Sacred Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from Jn. 15:26: "The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can. vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life�giver, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and glorified." Therefore it should not be added in our Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema. Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St. Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath [spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son. Objection 7: Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-3.htm (1 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.3. is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir. Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another." And further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice." Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him. On the contrary, Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding." I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (Question 28, Article 3; Question 30, Article 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above (Question 28, Article 44). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-3.htm (2 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.3. confess. Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above (Question 27, Articles 2,4; Question 28, Article 4), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is impossible. Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father "through the Son." Some of them are said also to concede that "He is from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-3.htm (3 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.3. the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, "He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine" (Jn. 16:14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son. Reply to Objection 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the council of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, when certain errors rose up, another council [Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. Reply to Objection 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-3.htm (4 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.3. his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do those words of his express a denial thereof. Reply to Objection 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of Christ, by reason of what is written: "On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes" (Jn. 1:33). Reply to Objection 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word, whence proceeds love. Reply to Objection 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the Father. Reply to Objection 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other; but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as explained above, and in Question 27. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-3.htm (5 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:23 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son? Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immediately; which seems to be unfitting. Objection 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son. Objection 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical. Objection 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father---namely Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten." I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition "through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.4. artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this preposition "through" is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition "through" sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king. Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same meaning. Reply to Objection 1: In every action two things are to be considered, the "suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance, fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons. Reply to Objection 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.4. Reply to Objection 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal. Reply to Objection 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the mallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the king, although this preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the more a "suppositum" is prior in action, so much the more is its power immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of the subject's acting, the king is said to work through the bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection 2: Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity, because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son. Objection 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father. But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this word "principle" stands either for the person of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-5.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.5. false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Objection 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors." Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost. I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost. Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not signify "person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective; and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning should be: They are one principle---that is, in one and the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost---namely, in two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word "principle" signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words "father" and "son" even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-5.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.5. "God"; so they are one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word "principle." Reply to Objection 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one property being in two "supposita" that possess one common nature. But if we consider the "supposita" of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both. Reply to Objection 2: In the proposition "the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is the form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects. Reply to Objection 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy Ghost. Reply to Objection 4: These two propositions, "The Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not the Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate. Reply to Objection 5: This proposition is also true:---The one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word "principle" does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained. Reply to Objection 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-5.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.36, C.5. Reply to Objection 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of the distinction of "supposita," as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the "supposita" but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the "supposita" but substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy ghost is from the Father and the Son as His authors," this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars36-5.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.1. QUESTION 37 OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST---LOVE Prologue We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? (2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:24 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether "Love" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called Charity, and all together one Charity." But no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of all together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. Objection 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. Objection 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is a medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was shown above (Question 36, Article 2), it seems that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son. Objection 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy Ghost Himself is Love." I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son. To see this we must know that since as shown above (Question 27, Articles 2,3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-2.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.2. names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this procession which are called "procession" and "spiration," as stated above (Question 27, Article 4, ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception---namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves---to the principle of that impression, or "vice versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten." It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as "understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-2.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.2. name of the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to beget." Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the divine essence, as was said above (here and Question 24, Article 2, ad 4). Reply to Objection 2: Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents, as stated above (Question 14, Article 4), yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there is more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word. Reply to Objection 3: The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from both. Reply to Objection 4: As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the word proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one whence love proceeds. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-2.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-2.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained above (Question 27, Article 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost. Objection 2: Further, the proposition, "The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might say that "the Father understands by the Son"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be said that "the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost," or that "the Father generates by the Son." Therefore in no way is this proposition true: "'The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost." Objection 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets Himself," or that "He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that "He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to love" is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false: "The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost." On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter." I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost," since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-3.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.3. In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that "the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten." Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost"---that is, "by His essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth. To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, and "man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action---that is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-3.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.3. or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding. Reply to Objection 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained. Reply to Objection 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as by a notional act; forasmuch as "to speak" imports a determinate person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act. Reply to Objection 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word "begotten" adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-3.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.37, C.3. loving all creatures. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars37-3.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.38, C.1. QUESTION 38 OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT Prologue There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name? (2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars38-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.38, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether "Gift" is a personal name? Objection 1: It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of "Gift" does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He also gives Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. Objection 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. Objection 4: Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is "Gift." I answer that, The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars38-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.38, C.2. Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can "be given," and can be a "gift." Reply to Objection 1: The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction, in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, "this is this one's," can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third sense "this is this one's" through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal name. Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first sense, as being the Father's by way of identity. Reply to Objection 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained. Reply to Objection 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above (Question 34, Article 3). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars38-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:25 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.38, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars38-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.38, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost? Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Is. 9:16 says: "A Son is give to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost. Objection 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost. Objection 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift" only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born' is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be the Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost. I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost. In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)---i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a return---and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (Question 27, Article 4; Question 37, Article 1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ." Reply to Objection 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars38-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.38, C.3. similitude of its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" (Jn. 3:16). Reply to Objection 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Ghost---that is, His procession. Reply to Objection 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars38-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.1. QUESTION 39 OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE Prologue Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other. As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person? (2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence? (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular? (4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense? (5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract? (6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names? (7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons? (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.1. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether in God the essence is the same as the person? Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum," there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded (Question 28, Article 3; Question 30, Article 2). Therefore essence is not the same as person. Objection 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same. Objection 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis." Therefore person is not the same as essence. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father." I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Question 3, Article 3) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as "suppositum," which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be "adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference to another," and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above (Question 28, Article 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.2. above stated (Question 29, Article 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons. Reply to Objection 1: There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the "supposita"; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence. Reply to Objection 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other. Reply to Objection 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained (Question 13, Articles 1,3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called "subjects," "supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine persons are named "supposita" or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed any real "supposition" or "subjection." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:26 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence? Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence. Objection 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted. Objection 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature. Objection 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence. Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]." Objection 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.3. homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence. I answer that, As above explained (Question 13, Articles 1,2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the "suppositum" of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form. Reply to Objection 1: Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for the essence. Reply to Objection 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the same import. Reply to Objection 3: Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature." Reply to Objection 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.3. wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"---that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one essence." Reply to Objection 5: The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from the same essence." Reply to Objection 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons? Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name "God," should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods." Objection 2: Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may be rendered "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several Gods," and not "one" God. Objection 3: Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons. Objection 4: Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are "three Gods." On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God." I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.4. accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their "supposita." In creatures, one form does not exist in several "supposita" except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained (Article 2), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above (Question 3, Article 7; Question 11, Article 4). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of "supposita." For we say there are three "existent" or three "wise" beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense" beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal being," as Athanasius declares. Reply to Objection 1: Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name "God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having Godhead," it does not follow that there are three Gods. Reply to Objection 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of "supposita" the Greeks said "three hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance," lest plurality be referred to the substance. Reply to Objection 3: This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.4. Reply to Objection 4: The form signified by the word "person" is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities---that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost---it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:27 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person? Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For, as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for." But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained (Article 3). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person. Objection 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person. Objection 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget," because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods. Objection 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, "God begot God." Objection 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God." On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God." I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-5.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.5. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17). Reply to Objection 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several "supposita." So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies. Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the word "God" does not naturally stand for person. Reply to Objection 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person---that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"---that is, the divine essence---is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-5.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.5. the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above (Article 3). Reply to Objection 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same "suppositum." Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se]," forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained (Question 31, Article 2), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error. Reply to Objection 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to "God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-5.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.5. that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the "suppositum." Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-5.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person? Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence." Objection 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated. Objection 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained (Question 3, Article 3). But, as was shown, it is true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true: "Essence begets essence." Objection 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets. Objection 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not begetting": which cannot be. Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence. I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.6. nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated (Article 4). Now although "God" is really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for instance, we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained (Article 4). The word "essence," however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the "supposita." Reply to Objection 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to "supposita." So "nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence." Reply to Objection 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally. Reply to Objection 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.6. Reply to Objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular. Reply to Objection 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective indicates something added to the "suppositum." Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence. Reply to Objection 6: So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita," it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms? Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, "God is the Trinity," is false. Objection 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an accidental sense. On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [Serm. ii, in coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity." I answer that, As above explained (Article 5), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God" can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (Article 4, ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true to say, "God is the three persons." Reply to Objection 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man"; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.7. On the contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita" of the divine nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction. Reply to Objection 2: When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of itself true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by no means accidentally. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:28 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons? Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons. Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons. Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons. On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded (Question 32, Article 1), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (Question 32, Article 1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-8.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.8. or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called "appropriation." The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God. Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the truth. Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence. Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-8.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.8. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-8.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors? Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates three names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image" proper to the Son (Question 35, Article 2), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift," which is proper to the Holy Ghost (Question 38, Article 2). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of existence; "species," the principle of existence; and 'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained (Question 37, Article 2, ad 1). But, as he subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons. Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness." Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, "Christ the strength of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, "strength came out from Him and healed all" (Lk. 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father. Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in a confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.'" This, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-9.htm (1 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.9. however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle from no principle." Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to Jn. 14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is. 65:1, "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son. I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God. According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is "a principle without a principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-9.htm (2 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.9. three conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color. The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): "Where---that is, in the Son---there is supreme and primal life," etc. The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc. The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc. "Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the "use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons. The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-9.htm (3 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.9. "equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For "unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle." "Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united. According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness." This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the nature and object of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-9.htm (4 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.9. love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength. According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition "by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power. Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth" belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Question 16, Article 1), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-9.htm (5 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.39, C.9. itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained (Question 24, Article 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun "this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars39-9.htm (6 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.1. QUESTION 40 OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES Prologue We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether relation is the same as person? (2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons? (3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct? (4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:29 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether relation is the same as person? Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration. Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or property, is not the same as person in God. Objection 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not the same as person in God. On the contrary, in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the persons. I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons; and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations "assistant," as above explained (Question 28, Article 2). But since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above (Question 39, Article 1), relation must necessarily be the same as person. Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated above (Question 32, Article 2). We must, however, say that file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.2. there are properties in God; as we have shown (Question 32, Article 2). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God, and yet is God. Reply to Objection 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above explained (Question 30, Article 2). Reply to Objection 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the persons, but not the essence. Reply to Objection 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum." Now, properties are not designated as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita." And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations? Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation. Objection 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But "hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations. Objection 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction. Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations. Objection 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be relation. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons." I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by way of the form, as "paternity." Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.3. hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the material principles. This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting the person. It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term "Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.3. Reply to Objection 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations. Reply to Objection 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction. Reply to Objection 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation. Reply to Objection 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons? Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that to which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken away; as man is something added to animal which can be understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a person, the hypostasis remains. Objection 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." So when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains "someone"---that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed from person, the hypostasis remains. Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation be removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as regards the other persons. I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.4. from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle, and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "substance is common and hypostasis is particular." So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular. But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the non�personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the Father's hypostasis or person remains. If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own "supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained (Article 2), it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however, think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons, remain. But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above (Article 2); secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that, "person is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.4. to have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person. Reply to Objection 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially to both. Reply to Objection 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow, however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow that He is not a person. Reply to Objection 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the Jews understand it. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:30 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts? Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i, D, xxvii) that "the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence. Objection 2: Further, in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes quantity. But paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation. Objection 3: Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes generation. On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore in the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation. I answer that, According to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because He begets, He is the Father." A distinction, however, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive signification---active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non�personal relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.40, C.5. property common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person acting. Reply to Objection 1: When the Master says that "because He begets, He is Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because He is Father He begets. Reply to Objection 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but not as constituting a person. Reply to Objection 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as constituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the personal property of the Father. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars40-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.1. QUESTION 41 OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS Prologue We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons? (2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary? (3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or from something? (4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts? (5) What this power means? (6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons? Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten "genera." Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. Objection 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in God. On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God. I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons. Reply to Objection 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above explained (Question 32, Article 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.2. Reply to Objection 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of signification. Reply to Objection 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:31 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the notional acts are voluntary? Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son." Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will. Objection 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily. Objection 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature. Objection 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii). On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity." I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book De Synod, it is said: "If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.3. one, while the will is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God." Reply to Objection 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity---as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son." Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if love were the principle of the Son's generation. Reply to Objection 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained (Question 19, Article 3). Now, the Holy Ghost file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.3. proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will. Reply to Objection 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Word is natural. Reply to Objection 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the notional acts proceed from something? Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he is made white---it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing. Objection 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, which was disproved above (Question 39, Article 5). Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father's essence. Objection 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus. 24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zach. 12:1): file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-4.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.4. "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13) according to another version [The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit." On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says: "God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself." I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance. For it was explained above (Question 27, Article 2; Question 33, Articles 2,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true "generation," whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will be shown later on (Question 45, Article 1), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1 Jn. 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ." Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten. That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only begotten," according to Jn. 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the "first begotten," according to Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-4.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.4. whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above (Question 40, Article 2). Reply to Objection 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form. Reply to Objection 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"--- that is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father." This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son. Reply to Objection 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-4.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.4. Reply to Objection 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works" (Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-4.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts? Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (Question 25, Article 1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. Objection 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in God. Objection 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above (Question 25, Article 1). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts. I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating. Reply to Objection 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.5. not proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding. Reply to Objection 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated. Reply to Objection 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:32 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence? Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation. Objection 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of begetting. Objection 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence. On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget. I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter. Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God." We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii), and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.6. not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly. Reply to Objection 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets. Reply to Objection 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason. Reply to Objection 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.6. proper to the person of the Father. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act? Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in God. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not." Objection 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son. On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical. I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given. The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness. The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.41, C.7. manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost. The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (Article 2), and nature is determined to one. The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons. Reply to Objection 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son---that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power of generation"--- that is, a power by which it is generated by some person. Reply to Objection 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later on (Question 42, Article 6, ad 3). Reply to Objection 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars41-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.1. QUESTION 42 OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS Prologue We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry. (1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons? (2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity? (3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons? (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness? (5) Whether the one divine person is in another? (6) Whether they are equal in power? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:33 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether there is equality in God? Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons. Objection 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said (Question 39, Article 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality. Objection 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons. Objection 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons. On the contrary, Athanasius says that "the three persons are co�eternal and co-equal to one another." I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.2. things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons. Reply to Objection 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of "virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source---that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power." Reply to Objection 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.2. Reply to Objection 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways---namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect. But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely. Reply to Objection 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both --- namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are relative." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father? Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not co�eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both. Objection 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost. Objection 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father. Objection 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.3. of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist. On the contrary, Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are co-eternal with each other." I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above (Question 41, Article 2), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (Question 41, Article 2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both. Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.3. impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of God. Reply to Objection 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin. Reply to Objection 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated above (Question 27, Article 2). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting. Reply to Objection 4: In time there is something indivisible---namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures---namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above (Question 10, Article 2 ad 1, Article 4 ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature? Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in God. Objection 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature. Objection 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it. Objection 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature. On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order exists. I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle---namely, according to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause---so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated (Question 33, Article 1): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another." Reply to Objection 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.4. Reply to Objection 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason. Reply to Objection 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to natural origin. Reply to Objection 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:34 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness? Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him." Objection 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father. Objection 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father. On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God." I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes (Question 27, Article 2; Question 33, Articles 2,3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.5. of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature." Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood of Christ's human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety"---that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas "creatures are subject by their created weakness." Reply to Objection 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (Article 1, ad 1), and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue---"the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity," for there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver. Reply to Objection 3: In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (Question 30, Article 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.5. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely? Objection 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other. Objection 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Micheas 5:2: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father. Objection 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in the other. On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 14:10): "I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me." I answer that, There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), "The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost. Reply to Objection 1: What is contained in creatures does not file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.6. sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created. Reply to Objection 2: The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation. Reply to Objection 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power? Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said (Jn. 5:19): "The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's. Objection 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son according to Jn. 14:31: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I." The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doth" (Jn. 5:20). Also, the Son hears: "As I hear, so I judge" (Jn. 5:30). Therefore the Father has greater power than the Son. Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as proved above (Question 41, Article 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power. On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): "Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner." I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (Article 4) that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness---that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both. Reply to Objection 1: The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.42, C.7. receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se]." Reply to Objection 2: The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature. Reply to Objection 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving," signified by saying that He can be begotten. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars42-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:35 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.1. QUESTION 43 THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS Prologue We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent? (2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal? (3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent? (4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent? (5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent? (6) To whom the invisible mission is directed? (7) Of the visible mission (8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether a divine person can be properly sent? Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another. Objection 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: "What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one person is not sent by another. Objection 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent. On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 8:16): "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me." I answer that, the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there: either because in no way was he present before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the world" (Jn. 1:1). Reply to Objection 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.2. the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above (Question 42, Articles 4,6). Reply to Objection 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin. Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal? Objection 1: It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But the Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal. Objection 2: Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the mission of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal. Objection 3: Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal. On the contrary, It is said (Gal. 4:4): "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son." I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express only relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth." Others express the term of procession together with the relation to the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as "generation" and "spiration"; for generation is the procession of the divine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For a thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal. Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in God; but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal; whereas "procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission. Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean that He could be sent because eternally begotten. Reply to Objection 2: That a divine person may newly exist in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.3. anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord temporally by change of the creature. Reply to Objection 3: Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace? Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but that His gifts are given. Objection 2: Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to Rm. 5:5, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said that the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace. Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. Objection 4: Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But mission is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of the divine person is only by sanctifying grace. I answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone; and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace. For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.4. effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace. Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent. Reply to Objection 1: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given. Reply to Objection 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost." Reply to Objection 3: Although the Son can be known by us according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us according to those effects. Reply to Objection 4: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with some file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.4. qualifying term; just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:36 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the Father can be fittingly sent? Objection 1: It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given. But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends Himself. Objection 2: Further, the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him and make Our abode with him." Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent. Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all, except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as stated above (Question 32, Article 3). Therefore every divine person can be sent. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone is never described as being sent." I answer that, The very idea of mission means procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another. Reply to Objection 1: In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to the Person Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent." Reply to Objection 2: Although the effect of grace is also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He proceeds." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.5. Reply to Objection 3: Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in general; thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is according to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:11: "One and the same Spirit worketh all things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly. Objection 2: Further, the mission of the divine person is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held without the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly. Objection 3: Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as expounded above (Articles 1,4). But the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification. On the contrary, It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. 9:10): "Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness." I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace, according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent. Reply to Objection 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-6.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.6. first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (Question 38, Article 1), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Reply to Objection 2: The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge with love." Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is said (Jn. 6:45): "Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me," and (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire shall flame forth." Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia], according to Ecclus. 6:23: "The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name." Reply to Objection 3: Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained (Article 1), if we speak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying grace, nor is one person separated from the other. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-6.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.6. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-6.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace? Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is said (Jn. 7:39): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in grace. Objection 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all who share in grace. Objection 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace. Objection 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all that have grace. On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature. I answer that, As above stated (Articles 3,4,5), mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two conditions. Reply to Objection 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.7. iv, 20), that the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men. This was done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets." Thus the words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of Pentecost. Reply to Objection 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him." Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his possessions, or to undertake any arduous work. Reply to Objection 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace. Reply to Objection 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:37 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly? Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner. Objection 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in all these things. Objection 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any other person. Objection 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature---namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures. Objection 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost. Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent visibly. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-8.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.8. On the contrary, It is said (Mt. 3:16) that, when our Lord was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove. I answer that, God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as explained above (Question 12, Article 12). Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures. This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification. Reply to Objection 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by reason of any visible creature. Reply to Objection 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is said, "The rock was Christ" (1 Cor. 10:4). For that rock was already created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert, and to the lightning and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-8.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.8. thunder issuing forth when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass away." Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose. Reply to Objection 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them. Reply to Objection 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its use required. Reply to Objection 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel. Reply to Objection 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is said (1 Cor. 12:7)---"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"---that is, of the Church. This utility consists in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, according to Heb. 2:3, "which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-8.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.8. Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My beloved Son" (Mt. 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was said, "Hear ye Him" (Mt. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven" (Jn. 20:23): and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to speak with divers tongues" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were, however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed, cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-8.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally? Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), "The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if a divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other. Objection 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending. Objection 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds. On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Is. 48:16, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from Whom He does not proceed. I answer that, There are different opinions on this point. Some say that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine, however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son; so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to the person proceeding from another, whereas to send belongs to each person. There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-9.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.43, C.9. as the principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect of grace. The answers to the objections appear from the above. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars43-9.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.1. QUESTION 44 THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS Prologue After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings? (2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him? (3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes? (4) Whether He is the final cause of things? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:38 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God. Objection 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God. Objection 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause. On the contrary, It is said (Rm. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things." I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Question 3, Article 4) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (Question 11, Articles 3,4) that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.2. Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat. Reply to Objection 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused. Reply to Objection 2: This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible. Reply to Objection 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether primary matter is created by God? Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God. Objection 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the other. Objection 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other nigh unto nothing"---viz. primary matter. I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle, according to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.3. supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as "such," but as "beings." Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things. Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made. Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 40). Reply to Objection 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:39 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God? Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause. Objection 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above (Article 1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God. Objection 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above. Objection 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom. On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (Questions. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God. I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.4. the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas---i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind (Question 15, Article 1). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation. Reply to Objection 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind. Reply to Objection 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things. Reply to Objection 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars. Reply to Objection 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self�existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.4. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether God is the final cause of all things? Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end. Objection 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause of all things. Objection 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the end of all things. Objection 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible. On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all things for Himself." I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things. Reply to Objection 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.44, C.5. liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness. Reply to Objection 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end. Reply to Objection 3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God. Reply to Objection 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him, some of which come into our mind before others. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars44-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.1. QUESTION 45 THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE Prologue The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points of inquiry: (1) What is creation? (2) Whether God can create anything? (3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things? (4) To what things it belongs to be created? (5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create? (6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person? (7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things? (8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:40 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether to create is to make something from nothing? Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already." Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being. Objection 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing. On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing." I answer that, As said above (Question 44, Article 2), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," and white from "not-white." Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing." Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.2. however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above. Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto." Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being. Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing---i.e. it is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether God can create anything? Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create. Objection 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God. Objection 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing. Objection 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing. On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." I answer that, Not only is it impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God, as appears from what has been said (Question 44, Article 1). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.3. things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (Question 44, Articles 1,2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing. Reply to Objection 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Question 44, Article 2), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing." But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things. Reply to Objection 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (Question 13, Article 1), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence. Reply to Objection 3: In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.3. the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time. Reply to Objection 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether creation is anything in the creature? Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature. Objection 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature. Objection 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing. On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in the thing created. I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.4. without movement. Now when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (Article 2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of motion. Reply to Objection 1: Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (Question 13, Article 7) in treating of the divine names. Reply to Objection 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (Article 2, ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (Question 42, Article 1, ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons. Reply to Objection 3: The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things? Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things. Objection 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own component parts. Therefore composite things are not created. Objection 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created. On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them. I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above (Question 44, Article 2, ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being--- that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.5. Reply to Objection 1: In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above (Article 1). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen. Reply to Objection 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles. Reply to Objection 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:41 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether it belongs to God alone to create? Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create. Objection 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this. Objection 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved above when treating of the infinity of God (Question 7, Articles 2,3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other creatures. I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes (Article 1), that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-6.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.6. alone. It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power. But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally---that is, ministerially. And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation. Reply to Objection 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-6.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.6. participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own being, as we have said above (Question 7, Articles 1,2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:15): "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation. Reply to Objection 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre�exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary. Reply to Objection 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-6.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.6. no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (Question 7, Article 2), it follows that no creature can create. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-6.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether to create is proper to any person? Objection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person. Objection 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that "He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations. Objection 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power, goodness and wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations and processions. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead. I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-7.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.7. Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above (Question 14, Article 8; Question 19, Article 4), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will. Reply to Objection 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained. Reply to Objection 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through" usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (Question 39, Article 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-7.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.7. Reply to Objection 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom," and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-7.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:42 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.8. ARTICLE 7. Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity? Objection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated (Question 32, Article 1). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures. Objection 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude. Objection 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the unity of essence. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures." I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of "image." Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was said above (Question 27). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding. But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-8.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.8. reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one individual," and according "as it is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also are reduced those three, "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species," and "order," and also those he mentions (Questions. 83, qu. 18): "that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above. Reply to Objection 1: The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (Question 32, Article 1). Reply to Objection 2: A creature properly speaking is a thing self�subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things. Reply to Objection 3: The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above (Article 6). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-8.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.8. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-8.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.9. ARTICLE 8. Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art? Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation. Objection 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation. Objection 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other things. Objection 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical. On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation. I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-9.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.45, C.9. a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (Article 4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter. Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature. Reply to Objection 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly." Reply to Objection 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality, but according to species. Reply to Objection 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator. Reply to Objection 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are called creatures. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars45-9.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.1. QUESTION 46 OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES Prologue Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment: (1) Whether creatures always existed? (2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith? (3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:43 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the universe of creatures always existed? Objection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist: which is impossible. Objection 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist. Objection 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist. Objection 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum; which is impossible. Objection 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-2.htm (1 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.2. movement. Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing. Objection 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same conclusion follows as before. Objection 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no time except "now" which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the measure of what is time. Objection 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible. Objection 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (Question 44, Articles 2,3,4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also eternal. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-2.htm (2 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.2. Objection 1:: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal. On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 17:5), "Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and (Prov. 8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning." I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Question 19, Article 4) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (Question 19, Article 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration. Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative---viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal." Reply to Objection 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-2.htm (3 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.2. impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17). Reply to Objection 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before it received that power, it did not exist. Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin. Reply to Objection 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (Question 44, Article 1, ad 2). Reply to Objection 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world was. Reply to Objection 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (Question 45, Article 2, as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed. Reply to Objection 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-2.htm (4 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.2. must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was. Reply to Objection 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the "now" of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement. Reply to Objection 8: God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-2.htm (5 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.2. Reply to Objection 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (Question 19, Article 4; Question 41, Article 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as preordained by His will---that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author. Reply to Objection 1:: Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not being. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-2.htm (6 of 6)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether it is an article of faith that the world began? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began. Objection 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun. Objection 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist. Objection 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist. Objection 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist. Objection 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false. Objection 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-3.htm (1 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.3. 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5). Objection 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith. On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Heb. 11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God," etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively. I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity (Question 32, Article 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Question 19, Article 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith. Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-3.htm (2 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.3. God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (Question 45, Article 2). Reply to Objection 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4). Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human intellect, but not the divine intellect (Question 14, Articles 7,12). Reply to Objection 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world. Reply to Objection 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-3.htm (3 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.3. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise. Reply to Objection 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms. Reply to Objection 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity "per se"---thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are "per se" required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity "accidentally" as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes---viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity. Reply to Objection 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was disproved above (Question 7, Article 4). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine says [Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls, viz. that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later (Question 75, Article 2; Question 118, Article 6). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or least some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-3.htm (4 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.3. can exist from eternity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-3.htm (5 of 5)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time? Objection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time. Objection 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." I answer that, The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the beginning" are expounded---viz. "of time." And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded---"in the Son." For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning---that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), "In Him"---viz. the Son---"were created all things." But others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"---i.e. before all file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.46, C.4. things---"God created heaven and earth." For four things are stated to be created together---viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature. Reply to Objection 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time heaven and earth were created. Reply to Objection 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one point in a given movement---that is, whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after," because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said above (Question 45, Articles 2,3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before. Reply to Objection 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars46-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:44 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.1. QUESTION 47 OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL Prologue After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be threefold---first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature. Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry: (1) The multitude or distinction of things. (2) Their inequality. (3) The unity of the world. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God? Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Question 11, Article 4). Therefore He produces but one effect. Objection 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Question 44, Article 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse. Objection 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one---viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above (Question 44, Article 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one. On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:4,7) that God "divided the light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God. I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter. But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above (Question 44, Article 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms. Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.2. as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear later (Question 50, Article 3). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens. But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was shown above (Question 45, Article 5) that to create belongs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone---viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible. Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever. And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in Gn. 1:3,4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from the darkness." Reply to Objection 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.2. shown above (Question 19, Article 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above (Question 15, Article 2), it follows that, although He is one, He can make many things. Reply to Objection 2: This reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things. Reply to Objection 3: In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the inequality of things is from God? Objection 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal. Objection 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal. Objection 3: Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal. On the contrary, It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): "Why does one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun another sun? By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished." I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free�will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Gn. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3): "What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.3. there would be a hundred suns in the world?" Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things. Reply to Objection 1: It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, "God saw the light that it was good" (Gn. 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Gn. 1:31). Reply to Objection 2: The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.3. the Son proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality---namely, of proportion. Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he would make such material if he could. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:45 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether there is only one world? Objection 1: It would seem that there is not only one world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above (Question 25, Article 2). Therefore God has produced many worlds. Objection 2: Further, nature does what is best and much more does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God. Objection 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say "this man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the form is signified, and when we say "this world," the form in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds. On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 1:10): "The world was made by Him," where the world is named as one, as if only one existed. I answer that, The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, as shown above (Question 11, Article 3; Question 21, Article 1). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms. Reply to Objection 1: This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.47, C.4. xii, text 52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed. Reply to Objection 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He had made three; and so on to infinite. Reply to Objection 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars47-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.1. QUESTION 48 THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR Prologue We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures. Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause. Concerning evil, six points are to be considered: (1) Whether evil is a nature? (2) Whether evil is found in things? (3) Whether good is the subject of evil? (4) Whether evil totally corrupts good? (5) The division of evil into pain and fault. (6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether evil is a nature? Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things." Therefore evil is a nature. Objection 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature. Objection 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature. Objection 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature. Objection 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil is a nature. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good." I answer that, One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.2. good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other. Reply to Objection 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil. Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed. Reply to Objection 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil. Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.2. one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention." Reply to Objection 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether evil is found in things? Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from non�existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things. Objection 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been said (Article 1). Objection 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil. On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils. I answer that, As was said above (Question 47, Articles 1,2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible. As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil. Reply to Objection 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.3. Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself. Reply to Objection 3: God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above (Question 47, Article 2). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil." Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:46 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether evil is in good as in its subject? Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists." Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject. Objection 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But "non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject. Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject. Objection 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (Is. 5:20): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!" On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists only in good." I answer that, As was said above (Article 1), evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness. Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same---viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.4. a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good. Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing. Reply to Objection 2: "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil. Reply to Objection 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not "sight," but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good. Reply to Objection 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether evil corrupts the whole good? Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good. Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil. Objection 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good. On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot wholly consume good." I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality. The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality. Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-5.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.5. intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to Is. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature. Reply to Objection 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above. Reply to Objection 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away. Reply to Objection 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more. Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not "per se," but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-5.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.5. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-5.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether evil is adequately divided into pain and fault? Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault. Objection 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault. Objection 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for "temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault. Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that this division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil "because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain. I answer that, Evil, as was said above (Article 3) is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above (Question 22, Article 2); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.6. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault. Reply to Objection 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above (Article 3), therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature. Reply to Objection 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things. Reply to Objection 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault. Reply to Objection 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as including the idea of injury. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:47 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.7. ARTICLE 6. Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has? Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has. Objection 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above (Article 5), is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault. Objection 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault. On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain. I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to include privation of grace or glory. There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-7.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.48, C.7. the fault itself consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than pain has. The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has. Reply to Objection 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain. Reply to Objection 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection. Reply to Objection 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars48-7.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.1. QUESTION 49 THE CAUSE OF EVIL Prologue We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire: (1) Whether good can be the cause of evil? (2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil? (3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether good can be the cause of evil? Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said (Mt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." Objection 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil. Objection 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil. Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil. On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no possible source of evil except good." I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good. And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above (Question 48, Article 3). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.2. In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire---as, for instance, that it fails to heat---this comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil. Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil. Reply to Objection 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above (Question 19, Article 9), this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.2. inward heat. Reply to Objection 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre�exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect. Reply to Objection 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:48 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil? Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5,7): "I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?" Objection 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (Article 1). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 3; Question 6, Articles 1,4), it follows that also every evil is from God. Objection 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil. On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not�being." I answer that, As appears from what was said (Article 1), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above (Question 4, Article 1). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause. But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said (Article 1) that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2, ad 2; Question 48, Article 2), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.3. things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kgs. 2:6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above. Reply to Objection 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault. Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause. Reply to Objection 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil? Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good, the other of evil. Objection 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 3; Question 6, Articles 2,4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil. Objection 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil. Objection 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil. Objection 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is "per se." But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is the "per se" cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no "per se" cause, but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few. Objection 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause, as was said above (Articles 1,2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil. On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 3; Question 6, Article 4). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-4.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.4. Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils. I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good. First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above (Question 6, Articles 3,4). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good (Question 5, Article 3); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (Question 48, Article 3). Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above (Question 6, Article 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above (Question 48, Article 4), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good. Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above (Article 1), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause. Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above (Question 47, Article 2, ad 1). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-4.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.4. Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above (Question 2, Article 3). Reply to Objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause. Reply to Objection 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said above (Question 48, Article 3). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above (Question 48, Articles 1, 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act. Reply to Objection 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good. Reply to Objection 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil. Reply to Objection 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above (Article 1). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-4.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.49, C.4. number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man---that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason. Reply to Objection 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars49-4.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.1. QUESTION 50 OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED Prologue Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man. Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation. Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things. Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal? (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form? (3) We ask concerning their number. (4) Of their difference from each other. (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-1.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.1. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-1.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:49 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal." Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance. Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." Therefore angels are corporeal. On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels spirits." I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will (Question 14, Article 8; Question 19, Article 4). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature. The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.2. could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8). But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone. Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them. Reply to Objection 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation. Reply to Objection 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel is composed of matter and form? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form. Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand; whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form. Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter. Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel is in matter. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal." I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-3.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.3. understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things. But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter. It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial. But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God (Question 3). Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because "the species of things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-3.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.3. things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them "genus" and "difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their "difference." Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance. Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above (Question 3, Article 4). Hence God alone is pure act. Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-3.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.3. existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its "being" is finite as determined to some one special nature. Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is "infinite from below," as not received in any matter. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-3.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the angels exist in any great number? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above (Article 1). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number. Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature. Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies. Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above (Article 2). Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before. On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood before Him." I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.4. number of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31) because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of the first movements. But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels. Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): "There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers." The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude. Reply to Objection 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.4. reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Question 30, Article 3; Question 11). Reply to Objection 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few subjects. Reply to Objection 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones. Reply to Objection 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted above (Question 47, Article 1). Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:50 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether the angels differ in species? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species. Objection 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less---namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically. Objection 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels. Objection 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species. On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as "first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels are not of the same species. I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species. But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above (Article 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.5. And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus. Reply to Objection 1: "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature. Reply to Objection 2: More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less. Reply to Objection 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species. Reply to Objection 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above (Question 47, Article 3). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether the angels are incorruptible? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature." Objection 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual substances "have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation." I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above (Article 2), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above (Article 2), it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.50, C.6. incorruptible by its own nature. A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature. Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Question 62). Reply to Objection 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in existence by the Divine will. Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above (Question 44, Article 1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non�existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars50-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.1. QUESTION 51 OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES Prologue We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them? (2) Whether they assume bodies? (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them? Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute alone--- that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.): "Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies." But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them. Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them. Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are understood to be incorporeal." I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Question 75, Article 2), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.2. but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on (Question 84, Article 6; Question 89, Article 1). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels. Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (Question 50, Article 1) it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained (Article 2). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they termed demons. Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature. Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kgs. 2:6): "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.2. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:51 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether angels assume bodies? Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body. Objection 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (Article 1); while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies. Objection 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies. I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.3. them, as is clear from what has been said (Article 1; Question 50, Article 1), it follows that they sometimes assume bodies. Reply to Objection 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh. Reply to Objection 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body. Reply to Objection 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for forming the assumed body. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body. Objection 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life. Objection 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said (Gn. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob. 5:7,8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all the ways thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. Objection 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life. Objection 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having resumed life (Lk. 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored them as God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. Objection 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-4.htm (1 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.4. befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: "After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown" (Gn. 6:4). Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies. On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies. I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects; because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which has the faculty has the action." Hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such action. Reply to Objection 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels. Reply to Objection 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-4.htm (2 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.4. Reply to Objection 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84. Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices. Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater. Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (Tob. 12:19). Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-4.htm (3 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.51, C.4. Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge." Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars51-4.htm (4 of 4)2006-06-02 23:25:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.52, C.1. QUESTION 52 OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE Prologue We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry: (1) Is the angel in a place? (2) Can he be in several places at once? (3) Can several angels be in the same place? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars52-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:52 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.52, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel is in a place? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing which is in a place, but only a movable body." But an angel is not a body, as was shown above (Question 50). Therefore an angel is not in a place. Objection 2: Further, place is a "quantity having position." But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not in a place. Objection 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the container is more formal than the contained; as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not in a place. On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [Prayer at Compline, Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace." I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars52-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.52, C.2. comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it. And hereby we have the answers to the objections. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars52-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.52, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel can be in several places at once? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in several places at once. Objection 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places. Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the angel operates, there he is." But occasionally he operates in several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn. 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth." I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place. Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars52-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.52, C.3. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him. Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere. So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere. From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars52-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.52, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place? Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several angels can be in the one place. Objection 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place. Objection 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances. On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place. I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (Article 1), there can be but one angel in one place. Reply to Objection 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place; but for another file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars52-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.52, C.4. reason, as has been said. Reply to Objection 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not follow. Reply to Objection 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars52-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:53 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.1. QUESTION 53 OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS Prologue We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally. (2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space? (3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel can be moved locally? Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally. Objection 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally. Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally. On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally. I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (Question 52, Article 1), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-2.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.2. nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (Question 52, Article 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Question 52, Article 1), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous. Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel. Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and while it is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of "wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-2.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.2. from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible. Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality. Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation." file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-2.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether an angel passes through intermediate space? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement: which is not possible. Objection 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle. On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change: consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space. I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99). But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.3. places which are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the movement of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same place in two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the first and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement, there must be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first place from which the movement starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places. Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places. Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature; file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.3. but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without the intervening place. Reply to Objection 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident from the foregoing. Reply to Objection 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no comparison. Reply to Objection 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such movement. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:54 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous? Objection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant. Objection 2: Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's movement instantaneous. Objection 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term "whereto": but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term "wherefrom"; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom." Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said (Article 2). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time. On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it. I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom"; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term "whereto." Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.4. But there is a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a last "now" cannot be assigned in which it was in the term "wherefrom," just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements. But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same "where" in the first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On the other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last "now" it must have a different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last "now" he is in another place: but some "now" must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many "nows" succeeding one another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said (Article 1), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.53, C.4. But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens. Reply to Objection 1: If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will. Reply to Objection 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of movement; hence there is no comparison. Reply to Objection 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But the same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; as was already shown (Article 2). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above (Article 2). file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars53-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.1. QUESTION 54 OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS Prologue After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them. Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry: (1) Is the angel's understanding his substance? (2) Is his being his understanding? (3) Is his substance his power of intelligence? (4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect? (5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether an angel's act of understanding is his substance? Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Commentator [Averroes]. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action---that is, his act of understanding. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that "the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things to live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands. Objection 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands. On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above (Question 3, Article 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance. I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence and His action. Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.2. intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel. Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding. Reply to Objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act. Reply to Objection 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life." Reply to Objection 3: The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which differs from both. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:55 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether in the angel to understand is to exist? Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist. Objection 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist. On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand. I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act "to understand," of which the object is "the true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will. Reply to Objection 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-3.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.3. living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life. Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.' file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-3.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence? Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and "intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds." Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence. Objection 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (Question 50, Article 2). Objection 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them. I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (Question 44, Article 1). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-4.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.4. Reply to Objection 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive. Reply to Objection 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form---whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel. Reply to Objection 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-4.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.5. ARTICLE 4. Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel? Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel. Objection 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect. On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel. I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this---that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the active intellect. But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-5.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.5. intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (Question 84, Article 7; Question 85, Article 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally. Reply to Objection 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them. Reply to Objection 2: It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-5.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:56 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.6. ARTICLE 5. Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels? Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well. Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory. Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the same nature. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels." I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (Question 51, Article 1). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them. The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was said above (Article 3, ad 1). A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-6.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.54, C.6. opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for much labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we "sense it." And hence it is that we use the word "sentence." Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (Question 57, Article 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars54-6.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.1. QUESTION 55 OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE Prologue Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some species? (2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they have derived from things? (3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels? file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-1.htm2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.2. ARTICLE 1. Whether the angels know all things by their substance? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore the angel knows things by his essence. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it. Objection 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms of things, and not by their own substance. I answer that, The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-2.htm (1 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.2. does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things. Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the angel of his own nature. Reply to Objection 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial. Reply to Objection 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality--- because the angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from other things---but according to some common formality. Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-2.htm (2 of 2)2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.3. ARTICLE 2. Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things? Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things. Objection 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things. Objection 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible." I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances ---that is to say, human souls---have a power file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-3.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.3. of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances---that is, the angels---the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can know naturally. The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The lower spiritual substances---that is, souls---have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances---that is, the angels---are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature." Reply to Objection 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature." Reply to Objection 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagination, as was said above (Question 54, Article 5). Even granted that he could abstract file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-3.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.3. intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species. Reply to Objection 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-3.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:57 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.4. ARTICLE 3. Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels? Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal, seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal. Objection 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically; because to know anything generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not befitting. Objection 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which seems unbecoming. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms. I answer that, For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower. Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-4.htm (1 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.4. extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few. Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind. Reply to Objection 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot. Reply to Objection 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-4.htm (2 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.55, C.4. file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Pr.../mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/01/PrimaPars55-4.htm (3 of 3)2006-06-02 23:25:58 St. Thomas Aquinas THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA Translated by Fathers: L.56, C.1.